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11 Introduction
The provision of Unemployment Insurance (UI) involves a trade-oﬀ between insurance and work
incentives. Many economic researchers have studied how limiting the coverage of UI and the duration
of beneﬁt entitlement can restore work incentives (see e.g. Lalive et al., 2006, and references therein).
However, most UI schemes also provide work incentives by imposing job search requirements on beneﬁt
claimants and sanctions in case of non-compliance. This paper develops and estimates a non-stationary
job search model to evaluate the recent introduction of a scheme that monitors job search eﬀort within
the UI system in Belgium.
In many countries monitoring of job search eﬀort is organized along relatively standardized pro-
cedures (OECD, 2007). It starts oﬀ with a notiﬁcation (often at initial registration) by which the
unemployed worker is informed about the search requirements and the proofs thereof to deliver, about
the timing of the evaluations of search eﬀort, and about the associated sanctions in the case of noncom-
pliance. At the prescribed dates, past job search eﬀort is evaluated on the basis of transmitted paper
proofs of job applications or in face-to-face interviews. If the outcome of the evaluation is negative,
a sanction in the form of a temporary and partial reduction of unemployment beneﬁts (UB) usually
follows.
Early studies1 found positive eﬀects of monitoring programs, but, since programs themselves were
often combining counseling with monitoring, they could not disentangle which of these components
was responsible for such ﬁndings. A number of later contributions have succeeded in isolating the pure
eﬀects of monitoring. Klepinger et al. (1997) in the US and McVicar (2008) in Ireland demonstrate that
monitoring signiﬁcantly increases transitions to work.2 Paserman (2008) arrives to a similar conclusion
on the basis of simulations of a structural job search model estimated on the US data. His model also
learns that the job ﬁnding rate increases by enhanced search intensity and not so much by a lower
reservation wage. Re-employment wages are therefore hardly aﬀected. In contrast to this evidence,
Ashenfelter et al. (2005) ﬁnd that tighter search requirements in the US have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on
transitions to employment and Klepinger et al. (2002) report even slightly decreasing job ﬁnding rates.
This is in line with the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of job search monitoring reported by van den Berg and van
der Klaauw (2006) for the Netherlands. They argue that this result is caused by substitution of formal
by informal search, a phenomenon that would be especially relevant for well qualiﬁed workers on whom
they focus in their study. Finally, Manning (2009) reports that too strict search requirements may
lead UB recipients to stop claiming and withdraw from the labor market. Petrongolo (2009) conﬁrms
this, demonstrating moreover that monitoring substantially decreases employment stability and annual
earnings in the long run.
In Belgium job search eﬀort is only monitored since 2004 and it targets only long-term unemployed
workers, eligible to UI for more than 13 months. Evaluations comprise face-to-face interviews in which
caseworkers have quite some discretion in the evaluation of the fulﬁllment of search requirements. The
system is more lenient than in many other countries in that evaluations are much more spread out over
time and the ﬁrst negative evaluation does not lead to a monetary sanction. By contrast, if imposed,
sanctions are substantial. If one does not comply with search actions stipulated after the ﬁrst negative
evaluation, beneﬁts can be completely withdrawn: ﬁrst temporarily during 4 months, but subsequently
the entitlement to UI is completely halted. In addition, the threat that these sanctions are eﬀectively
imposed is high. The sanction probability ranges around 50-60 percent. This incomplete compliance
reﬂects the uncertainty regarding the eﬀective search requirements and regarding the measurement of
their fulﬁllment. Contrary to the literature, that often assumes perfect monitoring, we will explicitly
model this uncertainty.
1See Meyer (1995) for a review of US studies, and Gorter and Kalb (1996) and Dolton and O’Neill (1996, 2002) for a
review of European studies.
2Borland and Tseng (2007) provide evidence of enhanced exits from unemployment, but could not identify the exit
destination.
2Cockx and Dejemeppe (2010) have evaluated the impact on the job ﬁnding rate of the ﬁrst stage
of the new monitoring scheme, i.e. of the time between notiﬁcation and eight months later, just before
the ﬁrst evaluation takes place. Using the same data as in this research, their analysis is based on
a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) that exploits the gradual introduction of the new scheme
by age group. Between July 2004 and June 2005 only unemployed individuals younger than 30 on
June 30 were targeted, while those aged between 30 and 40 were only concerned by the reform in
the subsequent year. Based on this analysis they conclude that, in Flanders,3 eight month after
notiﬁcation the transition rate for thirty year olds was signiﬁcantly higher than in the absence of the
monitoring scheme, but this eﬀect was not estimated precisely. Since the RDD was only valid in the
ﬁrst year after notiﬁcation, Cockx and Dejemeppe (2010) could only evaluate the ﬁrst stage of the
monitoring scheme. In this paper we aim at evaluating all stages. To that purpose, we ﬁrst develop
a structural job search model that captures the main features of a streamlined monitoring scheme
and, subsequently, we adapt the model as to capture the speciﬁcities of the scheme that has been
introduced in Belgium. We explicitly model the decisions with regards both the job search intensity
and the level of the reservation wage. This allows to investigate the trade-oﬀ between enhanced job
ﬁnding rates and reduced job quality in terms of the level of wages upon re-employment. We then
estimate this model and ensure that the evaluation based on it is reliable by both internal validation
of the estimation results and external validation on a control sample selected one year before the
introduction of the monitoring scheme. Finally, we conduct a basic cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Structural econometric modeling of job search has made progress in several directions. Non-
stationarity in job search models was for the ﬁrst time introduced in the seminal papers of Wolpin
(1987) and van den Berg (1990) in discrete and continuous time, respectively. More recently, Ferral
(1997), Garcia-Perez (2006), Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006), and Lollivier and Rioux (2010) have
further developed the estimation of non-stationary models, all maintaining the assumption of exoge-
nous job search intensity. Bloemen (2005), van der Klaauw and van Vuuren (2010) and Foug` ere et al.
(2009) among others have estimated job search models with endogenous job search intensity, but as-
sume a stationary environment. To our knowledge, only Paserman (2008) allows for endogenous search
in a non-stationary setting.4 The estimated model does not consider monitoring of job search eﬀort,
but simulations based on this model investigate the implications of a simpliﬁed monitoring scheme in
which UB is withdrawn if search eﬀort falls below a particular threshold. Finally, van den Berg and
van der Klaauw (2009) estimate a stationary structural model that evaluates job search monitoring
in the Netherlands. They assume that (formal) job search eﬀort and the imposed requirement are
perfectly known by both, the unemployed workers and the caseworkers who monitor - an assumption
that is generally not tenable, in particular for the scheme we consider in this paper. However, in
contrast to our approach and in line with the theoretical model presented in van den Berg and van
der Klaauw (2006), they allow that informal search eﬀort is unobserved to caseworkers and can be
substituted by formal search. The model reveals that job search channel substitution does not only
reduce the eﬀectiveness of monitoring, but that, together with on-the-job search, it also mitigates the
adverse eﬀects of monitoring on job quality, as measured by accepted wages and job duration.
A distinctive feature of our model, compared to all other job search models that have explicitly
integrated monitoring of job search eﬀort, is that in a uniﬁed framework it simultaneously allows that:
(i) both, job search eﬀort from the perspective of the evaluator and job search requirements from the
perspective of the unemployed are imperfectly observable, so that the outcomes of the evaluations are
random; (ii) the outcome of the evaluation depends on realized job search eﬀort; and (iii) the timing
of the interviews is known in advance, so that forward looking unemployed agents anticipate them,
leading to non-stationary behavior in case of imperfect monitoring.
3Our paper focuses on this region of Belgium, since only in this region the monitoring of job search eﬀort was not
systematically accompanied with counseling. Only in this region the “pure” monitoring eﬀect is therefore identiﬁed.
4Launov and W¨ alde (2011) formulate and estimate a non-stationary matching model with endogenous eﬀort and
time-dependent beneﬁts, but focus rather on equilibrium eﬀects of UB reduction in a Mortensen-Pissarides setting.
3In order to better understand the implications of this distinctive feature, we set up a streamlined
model with monitoring which contains the UI scheme with a ﬁnite entitlement to UB, analyzed ﬁrst
in the seminal article by van den Berg (1990), as a special case.5 We prove that in this generalized
setting the unemployed worker monotonically strictly increases search eﬀort and strictly decreases the
reservation wage from the moment she is notiﬁed of the timing of the monitoring interview until the
moment the evaluation of job search takes place. As in a scheme with beneﬁt exhaustion, the expected
lifetime utility is decreasing throughout this period. This behavior reﬂects that the unemployed worker
anticipates the drop in expected welfare induced by a potential sanction at the monitoring interview.
As she discounts the future, she increasingly values this drop in welfare and accordingly intensiﬁes her
actions to avoid it.
If the sanction probability is equal to one, job search eﬀort and the reservation wage converges
smoothly to the post-sanction level and the job ﬁnding rate exhibits no “spike”. This contrasts with
what has been repeatedly detected in empirical studies,6 but is in line with the model of van den
Berg (1990). However, in the presence of monitoring there is an additional incentive to search for
jobs, since by searching more intensively the unemployed worker can reduce the sanction probability
below one. If the sanction probability is suﬃciently sensitive to past job search eﬀort, we show that
search eﬀort and, hence, the job ﬁnding rate may then even temporarily increase above the level that
would be attained after the actual imposition of a sanction. Nevertheless, since this rise in job search
eﬀort lowers the sanction probability, the worker will on average exert less eﬀort after the monitoring
interview than after beneﬁt exhaustion. We label this increase “front-loading” of job search, since
higher search eﬀort before the interview substitutes for lower afterwards. Simulations of the behavior
implied by the estimated model reveal that such temporary “front-loading” of search eﬀort is not just
a theoretical possibility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the streamlined model. Section 3 provides
information on the institutional setting in Belgium and explains how we adjust the streamlined model
to take the speciﬁcities of this setting into account. Section 4 develops the econometric model and
includes a discussion on identiﬁcation. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 reports the estimation
results: estimated parameters, goodness-of-ﬁt, external validation of the estimated model and an
interpretation of the results based on a model simulation. In Section 7 we use our estimations to
evaluate the monitoring scheme introduced in Belgian UI in 2004, ﬁrst by simulating average treatment
eﬀects and subsequently by conducting a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Section 7 provides a brief summary
and concludes.
2 Job-search in a streamlined monitoring scheme
In this section we derive in a continuous-time setting the job search behavior of inﬁnitely-lived unem-
ployed workers within a “streamlined” monitoring scheme. By describing a simpliﬁed scheme we aim
at explaining the essential features of the model. We also brieﬂy discuss how the simple model can
be modiﬁed to take some features of monitoring schemes in other countries into account. In the next
section the simple model is generalized as to capture the behavior of the unemployed within the new
monitoring scheme that the Belgian government introduced in 2004.
2.1 The Problem
In the streamlined scheme, it is assumed that unemployed workers are entitled to a constant unem-
ployment beneﬁt (UB) level bh. Calendar time starts at entry in unemployment so that (calendar)
time and unemployment duration are synonyms. At t0 ≥ 0, the unemployed worker is notiﬁed about
the timing of an interview at which monitoring of past job search eﬀort (from t0 onwards) takes place
5I.e. the case where the sanction probability is one and does not depend on search eﬀort of the monitored individual.
6See e.g. Meyer (1990) and the literature spawned by his contribution, and Card et al. (2007) for a critical assessment.
4and about the sanction she risks in case that job search eﬀort is deemed insuﬃcient. The worker does
not anticipate the notiﬁcation by assumption. In the streamlined scheme the sanction corresponds to
a permanent reduction of the beneﬁt level to bℓ < bh. In case of a positive evaluation, the worker
remains entitled to bh.
Job oﬀers arrive according to a Poisson process. Since in the data we do not observe any indicator
of job search eﬀort, we can only identify the ratio of the marginal impact of job search on the job
arrival rate to its marginal cost (van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006, p. 903). We choose to
normalize the numerator of this ratio to one. Consequently, job search eﬀort is measured in eﬀective
units: s(τ) directly measures the job arrival rate. The monetary equivalent instantaneous search cost
is denoted by c[s(τ)]. It is assumed that c(0) = 0, c′ [s(τ)] > 0 and c′′ [s(τ)] > 0.
The evaluation of job search eﬀorts takes place at t1. This moment is announced and thus known







where s(τ) denotes the instantaneous search eﬀort at time τ. Both instantaneous and average search
are perfectly known to the unemployed, but not to the caseworker (see below). If the observed
average search eﬀort ¯ So(t1,t0) is lower than the imposed search requirement R, i.e. if ¯ So(t1,t0) < R,
a sanction is imposed by reducing the beneﬁt level indeﬁnitely to bℓ < bh. Otherwise the outcome of
the evaluation is positive and the worker remains entitled to bh without any time limit.
As acknowledged by Boone and van Ours (2006) and Boone et al. (2007), it is very diﬃcult for
caseworkers to directly measure an unemployed’s search intensity. Often evaluators use the observed
average number of job applications per time unit, ¯ So(t1,t0), as a proxy for the true search intensity,
measured in the model by the average number of job oﬀers per time unit, ¯ S(t1,t0). We assume that the
number of applications and oﬀers are proportional to each other. To capture the idea of measurement
error, the factor of proportionality is random: ¯ So(t1,t0) = ε  ¯ S(t1,t0), where supp(ε) = (ε,ε) ⊂ [0,∞],
supp(X) denotes the support of a random variable X and ε ≤ ε. In addition, we assume that
caseworkers have some discretion in determining whether search eﬀort is suﬃcient. Therefore, R is
treated as random with supp(R) = [R,R) ⊂ [0,∞] and R ≤ R. On the one hand, this assumption ﬁts
well the institutional environment of the scheme that is analyzed. On the other hand, this is a more
general formulation, since a deterministic search requirement is just a special case. The outcome of
the evaluation is thus random from the perspective of the unemployed worker. For any given average
search eﬀort ¯ S(t1,t0), denoting Ψ ≡ R/ε, the probability of being sanctioned at t1 is therefore:
Prob




Ψ > ¯ S(t1,t0)
￿
= 1 − Prob
￿






We assume that Ψ is a continuous random variable with supp(Ψ) = [Ψ,Ψ) ⊂ [0,∞] and Ψ < Ψ, so
that ∀¯ S(t1,t0) ∈ (Ψ,Ψ) : π′ ￿¯ S(t1,t0)
￿
< 0. We also assume that Ψ > s+, where s+ (s−) denotes the
stationary search eﬀort after a positive (negative) evaluation, i.e. once the unemployed is entitled to
bh (bℓ) without any time limit and search eﬀort is no longer monitored. Without this assumption the
unemployed worker would always be positively evaluated without changing her behavior.
Observe that if search requirements become very tough (R and hence Ψ very high), then it may no
longer be optimal for the unemployed worker to comply, since it is then too costly to bring the sanction
probability down below one. In such cases the unemployed worker will behave as if a time limit has
been imposed on the receipt of UB at t1: ¯ S(t1,t0) < Ψ, so that π(¯ S(t1,t0)) = 1 and π′(¯ S(t1,t0)) = 0.
As such, an UB scheme with a time limit is a special case of our model. In Proposition 3 in Subsection
2.3 we claim that this special case never applies if Ψ = 0. In the empirical analysis we impose this
condition, since in the data nobody is sanctioned for not showing up at the monitoring interview,
the latter being the behavior of someone who expects to be sanctioned with probability one. In the
remainder of this section we maintain, however, the general formulation.
5The sensitivity of the sanction probability to average job search eﬀort (i.e. the “precision of the
inspection technology”) increases with the absolute value of the derivative π′[.]. In the limit, this
precision is perfect and neither ¯ So, nor R is random: ¯ So = ¯ S(t1,t0) and R = R = R. Our model does
not comprise this limiting case, however, since it is incompatible with the assumption that Ψ < Ψ.
We argue in Subsection 2.3 this limiting case also has fundamentally diﬀerent analytical properties.
Several researchers have assumed a perfect monitoring scheme. Manning (2009) and Petrongolo
(2009) consider that those who do not comply with the job search requirements instantaneously and
surely enter the “non-claimant” category. In the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature,
Pavoni and Violante (2007) and Wunsch (2010) assume that the planner can perfectly observe search
eﬀort if it pays a monitoring cost.
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006, 2009) introduce imperfection in the monitoring of job
search by distinguishing between formal and informal search channels and by assuming that monitoring
of job search eﬀort in the formal channel is perfect, while job search eﬀort in the informal channel
cannot be monitored at all. We do not allow for such a distinction here, since in the empirical analysis
below the monitoring is targeted at long-term unemployed individuals for whom the informal channel
most likely has “dried up”, as argued by the aforementioned authors and by Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson (2004), and Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004, p. 1069-1071). Given that virtually no
sanctions are observed in their data, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006, 2009) assume that
job-seekers do comply with the rules introduced by the monitoring scheme. As sanctions are frequent
in the Belgian monitoring scheme that we analyze subsequently, such an assumption cannot be made
here.
Boone et al. (2007) model the sanction probability similarly as we do, but impose (in a stationary
environment) that (average) job search eﬀort aﬀects the sanction probability linearly and that R is
deterministic and known by the job-seeker (see their Appendix C). Abbring et al. (2005) assume (in a
stationary environment) that “the individual does not exactly know the rules that he has to comply
with and that he does not exactly know what type of behavior will generate a sanction” (p. 608). In
their model this leads to a sanction probability that is completely independent of search eﬀort below
a threshold and zero above this threshold. We believe that complete independence is too strong an
assumption. Boone et al. (2009) study a random sanctioning scheme in the lab where the probability of
being sanctioned can only be aﬀected by the acceptance rate of job oﬀers. In the optimal UI literature
with two levels of job search eﬀort, Setty (2010) assumes a probabilistic monitoring technology in
which upon inspection the probability of being sanctioned decreases with the level of eﬀort.
Workers are assumed to be identical and risk-neutral, discount the future at rate ρ > 0 and
consume their current income entirely. By risk-neutrality, non-labor income other than UB does not
aﬀect behavior and can thus be normalized to zero. This assumption is required in the empirical
analysis since non-labor income is not observed. Workers can be either employed in full-time jobs or
unemployed. All employment requires some search in a preceding unemployment spell. There are no
job-to-job transitions. If employed, the worker earns a constant net wage w > 0 and enjoys leisure
the value of which is normalized to zero. If unemployed, the value of leisure (net of stigma costs) is
ν. Jobs dissolve at an exogenous constant Poisson rate δ ≥ 0. Workers who return to unemployment
are assumed to renew their entitlement to UB, irrespective of the length of their employment spell.7





where U(0) denotes the expected lifetime utility at the start of an unemployment spell.
An optimal search strategy implies that one accepts job oﬀers that pay a wage w as soon as, at
any moment τ ≥ 0, W(w) > U(τ). Since from (3) it is clear that W(w) is strictly increasing in w,
7This assumption is relaxed in the next section.
6this strategy is equivalent to accepting any oﬀer that exceeds a reservation wage wr(τ): w > wr(τ).
Therefore, if F( ) denotes the wage oﬀer distribution and ¯ F( ) ≡ 1 − F( ), the transition rate from
unemployment to employment at time τ is then
p(τ) ≡ p(s(τ),wr (τ)) = s(τ) ¯ F (wr (τ)) ≥ 0 (4)
and the survivor function at τ, conditional on being unemployed at t0 < τ is








With these assumptions the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at t0, U(t0), is the
discounted sum of three terms: (i) the “sum” from t0 to t1 of the instantaneous monetary equivalent
utility in unemployment (yh(τ) ≡ bh+ν−c[s(τ)]) weighted by the probability of still being unemployed
at each moment τ (P(τ,t0)); (ii) the “sum” from t0 to t1 of the expected utility of employment
conditional on acceptance ( ¯ W(τ) ≡ E[W(w)|w > wr(τ)]) weighted by the density of unemployment
duration at τ, p(τ)P(τ,t0); (iii) the expected lifetime utility right before the monitoring interview





yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿










where U− (resp., U+) denotes the stationary expected lifetime utility after a sanction (resp., positive
evaluation). Since bℓ < bh, U+ > U−. In Appendix A.1 it is shown how U(t0) can be derived from
the limit of its recursive deﬁnition in discrete time.8
The behavior of the unemployed over the interval [t0,t1] can be derived by maximizing U(t0) with
respect to (‘wrt’) the controls {s(τ),wr(τ)}τ∈[t0,t1] subject to the laws of motions for the two state
variables: the survival probability P(τ,t0) and the average search eﬀort ¯ S(τ,t0). Diﬀerentiating (5)
wrt τ yields the ﬁrst law of motion
˙ P(τ,t0) = −p(τ)P(τ,t0) (8)
Similarly, from (1) one obtains the second law of motion
˙ ¯ S(τ,t0) =
s(τ) − ¯ S(τ,t0)
τ − t0
(9)
Observe that by writing the density of unemployment duration as p(τ)P(τ,t0) and treating P(τ,t0)
as a state variable the problem is drastically simpliﬁed, since it can then be solved by optimal control
rather than by stochastic dynamic programming. Application of optimal control instead of dynamic
programming technique in this framework has another decisive advantage, because it turns out that
explicit dependence of the sanction probability on the eﬀort accumulated up to the moment of eval-
uation makes dynamic programming approach intractable. In addition, the optimization problem





t0 (p(x) + ρ)dx
o
.9 The discount term is generalized in that the discount rate ρ is augmented
by p(τ) and the current value ˜ x of a variable x is generalized to condition on survival in unemployment:
˜ x ≡ x   exp
nR τ
t0 (p(x) + ρ)dx
o
= x   exp{ρ(τ − t0)}/P(τ,t0). In Appendix A.2 we show how to write
the optimality conditions in terms of derivatives of the generalized current value Hamiltonian which
no longer directly depends on time. In Appendix A.3 we derive on the basis of this Hamiltonian the
necessary ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) of the controls for this maximization problem.
8Alternative derivation using continuous time Bellman Equations is available in the Internet Appendix, Section A.
9Note that, using expression (5) for the survivor function, P(τ,t0)e





t0 (p(x) + ρ)dx
o
. See Spinnewyn (1990) for another example of this approach.
72.2 Optimality Conditions
The pair of optimal paths {wr(τ),s(τ)} obeys two FOC. The ﬁrst one is:





(w − wr(τ))dF(w) + ˙ U(τ). (10)
Using that ˙ wr(τ) = (ρ + δ) ˙ U(τ), this expression generalizes the condition reported by van den Berg
(1990, p. 258) who assumes an exogenous job arrival rate (s(τ) = λ(τ) and c[s(τ)] = 0) and no job
destruction (δ = 0). The interpretation is as follows. The right-hand side represents the beneﬁts of
continuing search if one is oﬀered a job that pays the reservation wage. It consists of three components:
(i) the ﬂow of income bh to which one remains entitled by not accepting the job oﬀer augmented with
the net value of leisure; (ii) the probability of ﬁnding a job times the conditional expected discounted
cumulative wage gain relative to the reservation wage; (iii) the rate of appreciation of the asset value
of unemployment. In the optimum these marginal beneﬁts should be equal to the marginal cost
of continuing search, as expressed on the left-hand side of Equation (10) also consisting of three
components: (i) the opportunity cost of not accepting the job; (ii) the cost of search eﬀort; (iii) the
opportunity cost induced by foregoing the entitlement eﬀect if the job oﬀer is rejected: one cannot
beneﬁt from a fresh entitlement to UB in case of redundancy from the oﬀered job.













This generalizes the familiar condition that the marginal cost of search should equal its marginal
return (Mortensen, 1986, p. 871). The monitoring of job search increases the marginal return by
the second term on the right-hand side of (11). Increasing job search marginally at τ decreases the
sanction probability by −π′ ￿¯ S(t1,t0)
￿
/(t1 −t0). The division by (t1 −t0) reﬂects that the evaluation
occurs on the basis of average rather than instantaneous search eﬀort. The value of avoiding a sanction
is [U+ − U−]. Since this return realizes only to the extent that the worker has not left unemployment
before t1, we need to weigh it by the survivor probability between τ and t1. In addition since the
evaluation occurs in the future (t1 ≥ τ), the return is discounted by e−ρ(t1−τ).
2.3 Analytical Properties
When forward-looking agents have a ﬁnite entitlement to a ﬂat UB, van den Berg (1990) shows that the
reservation wage and, hence, the inter-temporal value in unemployment declines with duration until
the end of entitlement. By contrast, when analyzing job search monitoring schemes with sanctions
researchers have always assumed that the behavior of agents is stationary. Imposing stationarity is
valid if (i) monitoring is perfect (Manning, 2009, e.g.) or (ii) if the unemployed cannot anticipate
the future instant at which, or from which (as in the scheme studied here)10 the evaluation takes
place (Boone et al., 2007, e.g.). We have argued, however, that often job search requirements are not
sharply deﬁned or the measurement of search eﬀort is imperfect, and evaluating caseworkers have some
discretion in determining the outcome of the evaluation. Moreover, the moment at or from which the
evaluation takes place is usually not completely random. In this case the behavior of the unemployed
cannot be stationary. The intuition is that the risk of a beneﬁt sanction induced by the monitoring
provides incentives to reduce this risk. To the extent that the unemployed worker cannot perfectly
control this risk, which is the case if monitoring is imperfect, she reduces this risk by searching more
intensively for jobs and being less choosy in accepting job oﬀers. Since the worker discounts the future,
this eﬀect becomes more important as one approaches the moment at which the evaluation takes place.
10See Section 3.
8Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition. It generalizes the ﬁnding of van den Berg (1990) in that it
demonstrates that this result does not require that the sanction is realized with certainty. Moreover,
the sanction probability may depend on job search eﬀort, as long as this relationship is not completely
deterministic, as would be the case in a perfect monitoring scheme. Proposition 1 also states that, if
the sanction probability π[¯ S(t1,t0)] is less than one, the reservation wage and the expected lifetime
utility jump discontinuously to their stationary level, which depends on the outcome of the evaluation.
This contrasts to the van den Berg case in which no discontinuity occurs. Finally, according to this
proposition, the sanction probability is in the optimum always strictly positive. This follows from the
assumption that Ψ > s+.
Proposition 1 The solution {wr(τ),s(τ)}
t1
τ=t0 to the maximization of (6) subject to the laws of motion
(8) and (9) has the following properties:
1. ∀τ ∈ (t0,t1) : ˙ U(τ) < 0, ˙ wr(τ) < 0 ∧ ˙ s(τ) > 0.





Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Returning now to equation (11), the additional term on its right-hand side is exactly the term
that reﬂects front-loading of job search eﬀort: By creating the opportunity to avoid the sanction if
search eﬀort is suﬃciently high, monitoring of job search substitutes higher search eﬀort before the
evaluation for lower search eﬀort afterwards, in case of a positive evaluation. Remarkably, job search
eﬀort prior to the evaluation may even raise above s−, the level that is attained after a sanction is
imposed. In Proposition 2 we provide a suﬃcient condition for search eﬀort to increase above the
post sanction level s− if ¯ S(t1,t0) < Ψ and hence if π[¯ S(t1,t0)] < 1, i.e. if the monitoring scheme is
distinct from the UI with beneﬁt exhaustion. In the empirical analysis we report and discuss evidence
of such behavior. This front-loading of job search eﬀort reveals a new trade-oﬀ in the choice between
a beneﬁt exhaustion and monitoring scheme as competing instruments to ﬁght moral hazard in UI.
Compared to the scheme with beneﬁt exhaustion, monitoring of job search may, depending on the
monitoring technology, increase job search eﬀort and therefore the job ﬁnding rate ex ante, but this
needs to be traded oﬀ against a lower job search eﬀort ex post. Intuitively, the front-loading of search
eﬀort induced by the monitoring scheme is desirable if the social discount rate is suﬃciently high. A
detailed analysis of this trade-oﬀ is, however, left for further research.
Proposition 2 If ¯ S(t1,t0) > Ψ and if
∂ ln(1−π[¯ S(t1,t0)])
∂ ¯ S(t1,t0) > ¯ F(w−
r )(t1 − t0), then s(t1) > s−.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Front-loading of search eﬀort is more likely, the more sensitive is the probability of a positive
outcome to accumulated eﬀort (∂ ln
￿
1 − π[¯ S(t1,t0)]
￿
/∂ ¯ S(t1,t0)), since this increases the return to
front-loading. On the other hand, increasing the length of the evaluation period (t1 − t0) reduces the
incentive to front-load, since, the probability of a positive outcome being based on the average job
search eﬀort, this eﬀort must increase more durably to aﬀect this probability. Finally, the lower is the
expected lifetime utility in case of a sanction (U−), reﬂected by a correspondingly higher ¯ F(w−
r ), the
higher is s−, making it more diﬃcult for s(t1) to exceed s−.
Lastly, in Subsection 2.1 we claimed that if Ψ = 0 the behavior of the unemployed will fundamen-
tally diﬀer from the case in which a time limit is imposed on the receipt of UB at t1. This is formalized
in the following proposition.
9Proposition 3 If Ψ = 0 and s+ > 0, then π[¯ S(t1,t0)] < 1 in the solution to the optimization problem
that maximizes (6) with respect to the path {wr(τ),s(τ)}
t1
τ=t0 subject to the laws of motion (8) and (9).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The model presented in this section is simpliﬁed, but it provides key insights that would obtain
in more complicated schemes. In the next section we discuss the main additional features that are
relevant for the Belgian monitoring scheme. More generally, if, as in most schemes, a worker remains
subject to monitoring in case of a positive evaluation (OECD, 2007), this does not qualitatively
aﬀect the ﬁndings of the streamlined model to the extent that workers cannot learn from previous
monitoring outcomes. This is likely if, as in the Belgian scheme described below, caseworkers have
suﬃcient discretion in determining the outcome of the evaluation and if each evaluation occurs by
diﬀerent caseworkers. The optimization problem after any positive evaluation then diﬀers only from
the one described in this section in that the expected lifetime utility in case of a positive evaluation
is lower, since the worker continues to be monitored.
3 The Belgian Job Search Monitoring Scheme
3.1 The Institutional Setting
In Belgium, UI is organized at the federal level. The Public Employment Services (PES) are organized
at the regional level. They are in charge of counseling, job search assistance, intermediation services
and training. In Belgium a worker is entitled to UI in two instances: (i) after graduation from school
conditional on a waiting period of 9 months; (ii) after involuntary dismissal from a suﬃciently long-
lasting job. In contrast to many other countries there is no time limit to UI. School-leavers are entitled
to ﬂat rate beneﬁts while dismissed workers earn a gross replacement rate ranging between 40% and
60% of past earnings, which is bracketed by a ﬂoor and a cap. The beneﬁt level depends on household
type (head of household, cohabitant or single) and on unemployment duration for dismissed singles
and cohabitants.
Before 2004, job search eﬀort was not monitored. In 2004, an important reform introduced such a
monitoring scheme by which an end of entitlement can occur if search eﬀort is insuﬃcient. In order to
focus on the pure eﬀect of the monitoring scheme, the empirical analysis below is limited to a single
region (Flanders), where the monitoring scheme was introduced without any additional policy.
The monitoring scheme was gradually phased in by age group. Between July 2004 and June
2005 only unemployed workers younger than 30 (on July 1) were concerned. In the following year
those younger than 40 were included and between July 2006 and June 2007 those younger than 50.
Individuals older than 50 years are not targeted by the scheme.














10The monitoring procedure consists of a notiﬁcation and a sequence of face-to-face interviews.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the notiﬁcation, the ﬁrst interview and the subsequent interviews
in case of negative evaluation. If the outcome of the evaluation is positive at any of the interviews, a
new sequence of interviews is scheduled: 16 months later after the ﬁrst interview and 12 months later
otherwise.
First, the administration selects individuals who have been entitled to UI for 13 months or more.
Roughly one month later a notiﬁcation is sent by mail (t0 = 14). It states that entitlement to UB
requires to actively search for a job and to participate in any action proposed by the regional PES.
Some examples of search methods are provided and it is clearly stated that one should collect written
proofs of the undertaken search actions. The letter announces that one will be invited at the UI
oﬃce to evaluate the undertaken actions and that these evaluations start taking place 8 months after
dispatch of the notiﬁcation (t1 = t0 + 8 = 22).
These monitoring interviews last approximately half an hour. If search eﬀort at the ﬁrst interview
is deemed insuﬃcient an action plan is drawn up, but the worker is not yet sanctioned. If at the
next interview, 4 months later (t2 = t1 + 4 = 26), it is established that the worker does not fulﬁll
the plan, a second, stricter action plan is imposed and beneﬁts are temporarily withdrawn during
4 months. If again, 4 months later (t3 = t2 + 4 = 30) at the third interview, the worker does not
comply, beneﬁts are completely withdrawn and the worker can regain entitlement only after being
uninterruptedly full-time employed during at least one year. If an UB recipient is sanctioned, she can
apply to means-tested social assistance beneﬁts (more information about these in Table 3 below).
Table 1 presents aggregate statistics about the probability of a negative evaluation conditional
on an interview. These probabilities are relatively high. As already argued in the introduction
and in Section 2.1, this incomplete compliance reﬂects the uncertainty regarding the eﬀective search
requirements and regarding the measurement of their fulﬁllment.




a In Flanders averaged over the years 2004 to 2008, among those aged less than 30.
The frequency of monitoring contrasts quite starkly with that in many other countries: half of
OECD countries require reports of job search (in most cases) every two weeks or at least monthly
(OECD, 2007). On the other hand, sanctions in case of non-compliance of the action plan seem
generally tougher in Belgium than in other OECD countries. For instance, in the Netherlands, a
typical punishment for insuﬃcient job search is a 10% reduction of unemployment beneﬁts for a
period of 2 months (van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006). Moreover, since, as shown in Table
1, the sanction probability is relatively high, the threat that the sanction is eﬀectively imposed in
Belgium is substantial. By contrast, in the Netherlands close to complete compliance is reported.
Job-search eﬀort is evaluated on the basis of proofs delivered by the unemployed worker (copies
of letters of application, registration in temporary help agencies, proofs of participation in selection
procedures, etc.). Regulations do not specify, however, a minimum number of employer contacts to
submit. Consequently, caseworkers have quite some discretion in the evaluation process. However, as
this is a prerogative of the regional PES, they are not allowed to oﬀer job vacancies nor propose par-
ticipation in training programs. Moreover nothing guarantees that the unemployed will face the same
caseworker at the diﬀerent interviews. There is therefore no scope for learning about the evaluation
11standards across interviews.
3.2 Implications for the Job Search Model
In this section we extend the streamlined job search model of Section 2 as to capture the main
speciﬁcities of the Belgian scheme. All derivations of the models with these extensions can be found
in the Internet Appendix, Section B.
A ﬁrst speciﬁc feature is that after a positive evaluation a next assessment of job search is scheduled,
but this will not take place before 12 to 16 months later. Assuming, as in the streamlined scheme, that
any positive evaluation entitles the unemployed worker to the high UB level bh without any time limit
seems therefore a reasonable approximation. On the other hand, if the outcome of the monitoring
is negative, the worker is not immediately excluded indeﬁnitely from UI: (i) at the ﬁrst interview
an action plan is imposed, but the UB level remains at bh; (ii) at the second interview beneﬁts are
temporarily reduced to bℓ; (iii) the end of entitlement follows only at the third interview.
The succession of interviews in case of a negative evaluation does not have a major impact on
the structure of the optimization problem, since the new problem just consists of a sequence of three
independent optimization problems that resemble very closely the one presented in Section 2 and that
are connected to each other through the transversality conditions. If tk denotes the moment at which
the kth interview takes place (k ∈ {1,2,3}), then the optimization problem over the period [t0,∞) can
be split over the next four sub-periods: [t0,t1), [t1,t2), [t2,t3) and [t3,∞). For the last sub-period and
for the periods that follow a positive evaluation at any of the interviews the problem corresponds to a
standard stationary job search model. For the ﬁrst three sub-periods, in case of a negative evaluation





yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿










where Uk(τ) denotes the expected lifetime utility at time τ ∈ [tk−1,tk) of someone who is evaluated
negatively (or notiﬁed) at tk−1, U4(t3) ≡ U−, and πk
￿¯ S(tk,tk−1)
￿
is the probability that average search
eﬀort between tk−1 an tk is regarded as insuﬃcient. This probability depends on k. The optimization
problem can be solved by backward induction and the problem in each of the sub-periods hardly diﬀer
from the one described in Section 2.
Another adjustment concerns the entitlement eﬀect if the worker returns to unemployment after
an employment spell. In the streamlined model it was assumed that the worker is then entitled to
the beneﬁts and job search requirements of someone who starts a fresh unemployment spell at t0 = 0
yielding lifetime utility U(0). However, in the Belgian scheme this occurs only if the worker has been
uninterruptedly full time employed for at least one year. For any employment spell that is shorter, the
entitlement duration counter remains at the value at which unemployment was last left. We assume
that the latter holds for all individuals.12
Apart from inﬂuencing the entitlement to beneﬁts, short-lived jobs also occupy an important place
in the evaluation process, because in the guidelines for evaluation the caseworkers are instructed to
take work experience as a suﬃcient evidence of high enough job search eﬀort. A descriptive analysis
of the factors correlated with a positive evaluation conﬁrms the importance of work experience. As we
are compelled to take this feature into account, we assume that for workers returning to unemployment
the sanction probability does no longer depend on past job search eﬀort. Let superscript e denote
whether a worker has interrupted unemployment (e = 1) or not (e = 0) between two interviews. Then,






k is a ﬁxed number.
11For k = 3, yℓ(τ) replaces yh(τ).
12A more general treatment would introduce a good deal of complexity without furthering our present purpose.
12If τ refers to the moment at which unemployment is left, U(0) should therefore be replaced by
U1
k(τ) in (3) and in (10), Uk(.) and Uk(.) by Ue
k and Ue










dF (w). This introduces a new state variable, U1
k(τ), in the
problem. However, by the assumption of a constant sanction probability when e = 1, its law of motion
is independent of the other state and control variables. It therefore does not aﬀect the optimization
problem for the case that e = 0 apart from introducing some exogenous time dependence. This time
dependence can be found by solving the modiﬁed optimization problems sequentially, starting with
e = 1 and then proceeding with e = 0. Note that if e = 1 the assumption of a constant sanction
probability implies that π1′
k (.) = 0, so that the second term on the right-hand side of (11) drops. The
optimization problem then resembles the case of a beneﬁt entitlement with a time limit except that
the sanction probability is exogenously set to a level lower than one.
Finally, due to administrative delays in managing the interviews, the interviews do not take place
at the scheduled moments (t1 = 22, t2 = 26 and t3 = 30), but at some random instant later on. In
order to get a better ﬁt of the data, the model takes this delay into account. Each period [tk−1,tk)
is therefore split up in two sub-periods of which the second ends at a random instant and the ﬁrst





0 = t0. The ﬁrst
sub-period corresponds to the scheduled period during which no interviews can take place. In the
second sub-period it is assumed that interviews occur at some random moment T∗
k, where t∗
k denotes
its realization. The realized delay, (t∗
k − t′
k), is assumed to be the minimum of a random draw from
an exponential distribution with mean 1/q and some ﬁxed maximum delay ¯ t∗
k, which is determined in
accordance to the maximum observed delay in the data.
This additional feature modiﬁes the optimization problem in the following ways. Let us denote the
expected lifetime utility for the ﬁrst and second sub-period by Ue
k,1 and Ue
k,2. For the ﬁrst sub-period
[t∗
k−1,t′















































4,1(τ) ≡ U− and the generalized discount rate is now ρ + p(τ) + q. It follows that the beneﬁt
of search induced by monitoring, as expressed in the second term on the right-hand side of the FOC
for search eﬀort (11), is now furthermore discounted by q and, rather than being evaluated at the
predetermined moment tk, it is now evaluated at any time between t′
k and ¯ t∗
k the interview takes
place. The details can be found in the Internet Appendix, Section B.2. Since this feature was just
introduced to improve the ﬁt of the model to the data and since this feature is not the focus of this
paper, in the rest of the exposition we ignore interpretations with regards to delays in interviews.
4 The Econometric Model
4.1 Speciﬁcation
Estimation of the structural model requires speciﬁcation of the unknown functions c(.), F(.), πe
k(.) (for
e = 0,1 and k = 1,2,3) and a choice of the way in which these functions and unknown parameters of





13the model (ρ, ν, δ and q) depend on individual characteristics. As to the latter, the level of beneﬁts
(bh,bl) is a ﬁrst source of heterogeneity. In addition, the cost of search and the separation rate depend
on gender and three levels of education (low, medium and high),14 which we denote - including the
intercept - by x. Computational limitations did not allow for a more extensive dependence on observed
or on unobserved characteristics. However, this does not seem that restrictive in this particular study,
since the target group of the monitoring scheme is long-term unemployed. Consequently, through the
dynamic selection over the unemployment spell, this group is already relatively homogeneous. This is
conﬁrmed by the internal and external validation analysis reported in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
The relative value of leisure and the job separation rate are speciﬁed respectively as ν = exp{˜ ν}
and δ(x) = exp{x′ζδ}. As explained in Section 2, the arrival rate of job oﬀers is equal to the level of
search eﬀort measured in eﬀective units. This normalization of search eﬀort aﬀects the interpretation
once we allow for heterogeneous workers. Highly-educated workers for instance exert less eﬀort than
low-educated workers to attain the same eﬀective search intensity. We account for this by allowing
the marginal cost of eﬀective search to depend on individual characteristics. However, we maintain
the assumption that the monitoring is directly (but imperfectly) related to eﬀective search intensity







The net wage oﬀer density f(w) is assumed to be log-normal: w ∼ LN ( ,σ). Observed net wages
are measured with a multiplicative error m: wo = w m, and the density function of the measurement




. Following Christensen and Kiefer (1994),












The probability of being sanctioned at the kth interview (k ∈ {1,2,3}) for someone who did not
leave unemployment since notiﬁcation (e = 0) and someone who returned to unemployment after a





















k ≥ 0. (20)
In relation with Proposition 3, notice that Ψk = 0.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
Individuals are sampled after 13 months of UI entitlement (ts ≡ t0 − 1 = 13). The data contain
information on the observed individual characteristics (x), on the UB level that is paid out to each
individual and on the duration of the unemployment spell (du). For any observed unemployment
spell of length du the data provide information about the timing of monitoring within this spell:
The unemployment duration at the moment of notiﬁcation (t∗
0) and the unemployment duration at




k = ∅ if the kth interview did not yet take place.
Furthermore, for each observed kth interview the data provide the outcome ({Ok}
3
k=1) of the evaluation
of job search eﬀort, where Ok = 0 if the outcome is positive, Ok = 1 the outcome is negative and
Ok = ∅ if the interview did not yet take place.
Whenever the unemployed individual leaves to the destination other than full-time employment
we right-censor the unemployment duration at the observed length du. Once the destination state is
14Respectively, (i) primary or lower secondary, (ii) upper-secondary education and (iii) higher education.
14full-time employment, we record the net wage earned at the start of the employment spell (wo) and
the duration of the employment spell (dj). Similar to the duration of unemployment, the observed
employment spell is right-censored if one leaves for destinations other than unemployment.
The values for job search eﬀort se(τ) and the reservation wage we
r(τ) at time τ are obtained from
the solution of the optimal control problem as described in Appendix C. These control variables are
conditional on functions of x and of all the parameters of the model. To avoid cumbersome expressions
we ignore this dependence in the notation.
Identiﬁcation of most parameters is quite standard (Flinn and Heckman, 1982; Eckstein and
van den Berg, 2007; Keane et al., 2011). We brieﬂy discuss identiﬁcation for individuals with a
given set of observed characteristics x and a particular level of UB. Since the log-normal is recoverable
from a truncated distribution, the observed wages and the parametric assumption on the measurement
error of wages is suﬃcient to identify the reservation wage, the complete wage oﬀer distribution (  and
σ) and the variance of the measurement error (ω2). Given that the reservation wage and the wage oﬀer
distribution are identiﬁed, one can recover the job arrival rate (and hence search intensity)15 from data
on the duration at which jobs are found. In a stationary setting, since the level of UB and the length
of the scheduled and delay intervals are observed, the relative value of leisure (˜ ν) and the marginal
cost of search (and therefore ζc) can be identiﬁed from the FOC of the reservation wage and the search
eﬀort for any given job separation rate (δ), discount rate (ρ) and probability of negative evaluation
(πe
k(.), for e ∈ {0,1} and k ∈ {1,2,3}). The parameters of job separation rate ζδ are identiﬁed from
the observed employment durations dj. Since behavior is non-stationary, the discount rate ρ can be
identiﬁed from the diﬀerential equations describing the time paths of the control variables.16 The pa-
rameter βe
1 (for e ∈ {0,1}) that determines the probability of negative evaluation at the ﬁrst interview
is identiﬁed from the observed outcome (O1) at the ﬁrst evaluation of job search eﬀort (e = 0) and
from the observation of an employment experience since notiﬁcation (e = 1). Since the second and
third evaluation interviews are observed for very few individuals (see Table 4 in Section 5.2), βe
2 and
βe
3 are identiﬁed from aggregate observations on the outcomes of these evaluations. How this is done
is explained in the next paragraph. Finally, q is identiﬁed from observed lengths of interview delays.
Identiﬁcation of βe
2 and βe
3 from aggregate observations of the probability of negative evaluation
is achieved under the assumption that βe
k = κkβe
1, where κk is a ﬁxed constant independent of e,
and that the sample average of the probability of a negative evaluation at the kth interview (¯ πk) is
proportional to the aggregate observed probability of negative evaluation (πa
k) presented in Table 1,
i.e. ∀k ∈ {1,2,3} : ¯ πk = f   πa
k, where f is a ﬁxed constant independent of k. With these assumptions
κk (and therefore βk) for k = 2 and k = 3 can be found by solving the following implicit equation:
¯ πk(κk) = f  πa
k = ¯ π1
πa
1 πa
k, where it is made explicit that ¯ πk is a function of κk and where all terms on the
right-hand side are known or can be estimated (¯ π1). A complication is that the aggregate probability
of negative evaluation is conditional on being evaluated at the kth interview, while the sample average
is calculated for the sample of notiﬁed individuals for whom these evaluations are not all observed.
The sample average probability of negative evaluation is therefore estimated by a weighted sum of
expected individual probabilities of negative evaluation (all of which a function of κk). The weights
reﬂect that the likelihood of evaluation is not equal across notiﬁed individuals. In Appendix B it is
shown how this weighted sum is constructed.
4.3 Likelihood Contributions
To write down the likelihood contribution of an unemployed individual consider ﬁrst the probability
of surviving in unemployment until some given moment t. For that, let p0(τ) be given by (4) with su-
perscript e = 0 denoting that the worker did not leave unemployment since t0, and let p+ ≡ s+ ¯ F(w+
r ).
15Since we have no information on the intensity of search eﬀort, we identify search eﬀort with the job arrival rate (see
Section 2).







4 ≡ ∞. With these deﬁnitions, the
probability of surviving in unemployment until t, being notiﬁed at t∗




conditional on being unemployed at sample selection, i.e. at ts ≡ t∗
0 − 1, and on the outcome of the
















































Note that if O3 = 1,∀τ > t∗
3,e ∈ {0,1} : pe(τ) = p− ≡ s− ¯ F(w−
r ). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side in (21) is the survivor rate in unemployment between sample selection ts and t or the notiﬁcation
t∗
0, depending on which of the two comes ﬁrst. The term following on the next line gives for each k the
survivor rates in the scheduled interval [t∗
k−1,t′
k) and in the delay interval [t′
k,t∗
k). In the latter interval
re-employment and the occurrence of an evaluation are competing risks, which explains the presence
of q in the expression. However, if an evaluation takes place, the worker still remains unemployed.
Consequently, the probability of surviving in unemployment after t∗
k is the density of being evaluated
at t∗
k times the probability of surviving in unemployment beyond t∗
k. Since this density at t∗
k is the
product of the arrival rate of evaluation q and the corresponding survivor function, this explains the
presence of q in the last term on the third line on the right-hand side of (21). The last term also
contains the survivor rate in unemployment after a positive evaluation at any interview k.
The duration data are grouped into monthly intervals. We account for this grouping by integrating
over the corresponding time intervals and by assuming that at most one transition occurs within an
interval. With the result in (21), an individual contribution of an unemployment spell lasting du















× [exp{−δ(dj − 1)} − ce exp{−δde}] (22)
where ce = 0 if the employment spell that follows the transition from unemployment is right censored
(ce = 1 otherwise), and cw = 0 if the wage upon this transition is unobserved (cw = 1 otherwise).
Whenever the unemployment spell is right-censored, neither dj nor wo are observed any longer. In
this case the contribution to the likelihood (22) reduces to the survivor probability (21) evaluated at
t = du.
































for e ∈ {0,1}. Appendix C describes in detail how the model is solved and estimated.
5 Data
5.1 Sample Selection Criteria
The data originate from several administrative sources: (i) the federal UI agency for monthly infor-
mation on UB claims and the new monitoring procedure; (ii) various Social Security institutions for
16information about employment spells (including self-employment) and earnings (for salaried workers).
Our model does not explain the choice of working hours. Hence, as in the theoretical part, we restrict
attention to jobs registered as full-time occupations. This information is available from January 2001
until the end of 2006.
As of July 2004, the notiﬁcation in the new monitoring procedure was sent only to individuals who
were younger than 30 years old. Our sample ignores individuals who were at that moment younger
than 25 years old. The standardized average unemployment rate lies in the range between 4 and 5%
among the 25-49 years old during the period 2004-2006 in the region under consideration. Despite
these relatively good performances, about 45% of the total stock of unemployed was jobless for more
than a year.
In order to determine the population to whom notiﬁcations are sent in a particular month (e.g.
in July), the administration actually selects individuals who have been unemployed 13 months or
more according to the information available at the end of the second month prior to the month of
dispatch of the notiﬁcation (on May 31 in the example). Our sample contains individuals for whom
the entitlement duration was exactly 13 months at the end of each month between May and August
2004 and to whom therefore a notiﬁcation was sent between July and October, 2004 if they were still
UI claimants at that time. In accordance with the theoretical part of this paper, the notiﬁed people
are entitled to a ﬂat UB for an indeﬁnite duration (except if they are sanctioned of course).17 These
criteria lead to a sample of 903 individuals. We also selected a sample according to exactly the same
criteria one year earlier, in 2003. This pre-program data set made of 883 individuals will be used in
the validation exercise in Subsection 6.3.
Note, since sampled individuals may have found a job between the selection date and the receipt
of the notiﬁcation, we can check whether claimants anticipate the notiﬁcation. Cockx and Dejemeppe
(2010) cannot ﬁnd any evidence of such an anticipation (see their section 6.1.2). This means that we
can safely assume that the moment of notiﬁcation corresponds to t0 in the theoretical model.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics respectively for the sample selected in 2004 and 2003. Time-varying
variables are evaluated at the sampling date. Monthly earnings are measured at the start of a salaried
employment spell. All monetary variables are measured in 2004 euros. Table 2 reports information
with respect to the observed characteristics that we actually use: gender, the level of education, the
household type determining the beneﬁt level (head of household, single or cohabitant) and the type
of entitlement (school-leaver or work experience). The monthly levels of beneﬁts bh vary between
325e and 1005e, with an average in 2004 of 646e and a coeﬃcient of variation of 37%. Monthly net
earnings amount to 1,200e on average (with a coeﬃcient of variation of 23%). These statistics are
not very diﬀerent for the sample selected in 2003. Table 3 provides the levels of the beneﬁt, if any, in
case of a sanction. Recall that there is no sanction after a ﬁrst negative evaluation. The magnitude
of the sanction is the same after the second and third negative evaluation. However, the sanction is
temporary after the second while the entitlement to UB is completely lost after the third evaluation.
The magnitude of the loss bh −bl lies in the range [0,385] e/month (the lowest and the highest value
of the sanction is presented for category in Table 3).18
Table 4 displays the number of claimants at the various steps of procedure and the outcomes of
each evaluation in the 2004 sample. Since individuals in this sample may have found a job between
the selection date and the notiﬁcation, only 723 of the 903 sampled individuals are notiﬁed. Among
those notiﬁed, 162 attend the ﬁrst interview. Due to the length of the evaluation procedure, as well
as delays in the scheduled timing and frequent exits out of unemployment before the interviews takes
17For cohabitants, this is not always the case. For them, we only retain those entitled to a ﬂat beneﬁt.
18The absence of sanction for some school leavers is due to the equivalence between unemployment insurance beneﬁts
and assistance beneﬁts for this category. This concerns about 7% of the sample.
17Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Sample
2004 2003




Primary or lower secondary 34.8% 36.8%
Upper-secondary 40.0% 42.4%
Higher education 25.2% 20.8%
Type of entitlementa (monthly UB level in 2004 e)
Entitled by work experience 69.2% 72.7%
Head of household ([865e-1005e]) 22.1% 24.8%
Single ([725e-835e]) 32.7% 33.7%
Cohabitant (385e) 14.4% 14.2%
Entitled by schooling 30.8% 27.3%
Head of household (835e) 1.8% 2.3%
Single (595e) 7.2% 6.8%
Cohabitant (325e) 21.8% 18.2%
Unemployment beneﬁtsa
Mean (2004 e) 646 666




Observed net monthly earnings (1st spell)
Number of individuals 427 358
Mean (2004 e) 1,199 1,228




aAt the sample selection date.
18Table 3: Beneﬁt Levels in Case of a Sanction and Size of Sanction (Monthly Level in 2004e)
2nd and 3rd interview Min. sanction Max. sanction
Type of entitlementa
Entitled by work experience
Head of household ([865e-1005e]) 802 e 63e 203e
Single ([725e-835e]) 601 e 124e 234e
Cohabitant (385e) 0 385e 385e
Entitled by schooling
Head of household (835e) 802 e 33e 33e
Single (595e) 595 e 0 0
Cohabitant (325e) 0 325e 325e
aAt the sample selection date.
place, only very few sampled individuals are evaluated for a second and third time. Subsection 4.2
has explained how we deal with the low observed number of participants in these evaluations.
Table 4: Sampled Population at Each Step of the Monitoring Procedurea
Number of individuals 903

















a% in the population at risk.
196 Results
6.1 Estimated Parameters
Table 5 presents the structural parameters estimated on the sample of treated selected in 2004.19
Both unconditional and conditional speciﬁcations of the model are estimated, with the conditional
one showing great improvement over its predecessor: the likelihood ratio test statistic for 6 degrees of
freedom is equal to 61.08.
Table 5: Estimated Parameters
Coeﬀ. SE p-Value Coeﬀ. SE p-Value
ζc intercept 3.985 0.075 0.000 3.697 0.118 0.000
gender 0.350 0.115 0.002
low-skilled 0.335 0.139 0.016
medium-skilled 0.125 0.129 0.330
ζδ intercept −3.127 0.077 0.000 −3.959 0.162 0.000
gender 0.442 0.151 0.003
low-skilled 1.123 0.196 0.000
medium-skilled 0.861 0.166 0.000
ρ 0.010 0.007 0.172 0.026 0.012 0.038
  7.138 0.011 0.000 7.140 0.011 0.000
σ 0.112 0.012 0.000 0.124 0.009 0.000
ω 0.068 0.012 0.000 0.048 0.014 0.001
q 0.197 0.017 0.000 0.197 0.018 0.000
˜ v 5.543 0.155 0.000 5.323 0.171 0.000
β0
1 10.876 1.335 0.000 13.162 1.627 0.000
β1
1 1.705 0.320 0.000 1.705 0.320 0.000
From Table 5, the cost of search is signiﬁcantly higher for women and low-educated unemployed.
Unsurprisingly, the separation rate δ is notably aﬀected by the education level and to a lesser extent by
gender. Point estimates of the monthly discount rate diﬀer importantly between the two speciﬁcations.
In the unconditional speciﬁcation, this corresponds to an annual discount rate of 11.6%, compared to
32.3% in the conditional speciﬁcation. Although well-above usually accepted levels in welfare analysis,
these values are not at all outliers in the structural search literature (see Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002,
for France and the overview provided by Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2011, in their section 7).20
The net value of leisure in money equivalent (ν) is estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive. A number
of studies in contrast report negative values (see e.g. Bunzel et al., 2001 and Paserman, 2008). As
in Belgium, 80 to 90% of the unemployed are covered by UI, the stigma eﬀect of claiming UBs is
19The parameters κ2 and κ3 that are solved as to make the individual probabilities of negative evaluation at the second
and third interviews compatible with the aggregate observed frequencies (see Section 4.2), are equal to 0.7330 and 0.5216
for the unconditional and 0.7626 and 0.5599 for the conditional model, respectively.
20Discount rates elicited in the experimental literature are also of the same order of magnitude (see e.g. Harrison, Lau
and Williams, 2002).
20presumably lower than elsewhere. Finally, the standard error of the measurement error of wages is
small (about 5%). This is a ﬁrst evidence of the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model, to which we turn now.
6.2 Internal Validation: Goodness-of-ﬁt
This subsection looks at the within-sample ﬁt of the model. First, we consider the fraction of exits to a
job between notiﬁcation and the ﬁrst interview. Second, we look at the distribution of monthly entry
wages during the same period of time. Third, we focus on the probability of a negative evaluation at
the ﬁrst interview.
Figure 2(a) displays the cumulative probability of transitions to full-time employment between
Figure 2: Goodness-of-Fit
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(a) Cumulative probability of transition to full-time employment between
notiﬁcation and ﬁrst interview: model prediction (solid line), observed
frequency (circles) and the 95% CI (triangles)













(b) Survivor function of monthly net earnings between notiﬁcation and
ﬁrst interview: model prediction (solid line), observed frequency and 95%
CI (broken curves)
21notiﬁcation and the ﬁrst interview. The horizontal axis measures actual duration since notiﬁcation.
Using the point estimates of the structural model, the theoretical distribution of exits to employment
can be computed for each notiﬁed member of the sample. The solid line is the average of these
distributions. This curve reaches a horizontal asymptote at about 0.35 because as time goes by
more and more unemployed become interviewed for the ﬁrst time or exit to nonemployment. To
plot the circles, we have used the nonparametric estimate of the cumulative probability of transitions
to full-time employment in the absence of regressors. Conﬁdence intervals (CI) were computed by
nonparametric bootstrap. We have drawn 5000 times from the original sample with replacement.
The upper and lower triangles in Figure 2(a) correspond to the 0.025 and the 0.975 percentiles of the
aforementioned cumulative probability. The ﬁt is reasonable overall, and with the 95% CI starting
from the fourth month since notiﬁcation.
Figure 2(b) displays the survivor function of monthly net accepted earnings. To compute it, one
needs the reservation wage. Based on the point estimates, three theoretical duration distributions
can be computed for each individual, with respectively full-time employment, the ﬁrst interview and
the residual state as destinations. Taking 50 random draws from these distributions for each notiﬁed
individual, an exit to employment obtains when the duration to this destination is the shortest one.
Then, the reservation wage is calculated for the duration at which the unemployed exits to a job.
With this information, the theoretical distribution of accepted earnings (with measurement errors) is
computed. Finally, the average taken over all notiﬁed individuals leads to the solid and thick curve in
Figure 2(b). The thin broken curve which is close to the latter is the Kaplan-Meier survivor function
calculated on the basis of observed accepted earnings. The upper and lower broken curves provide
the corresponding 95% CI. The ﬁt of wage distribution turns out to be perfect throughout its entire
support.
The correct speciﬁcation of the probability of negative evaluation (at the ﬁrst interview) is checked
by testing the equality of theoretical frequencies of negative evaluation at the ﬁrst interview to the
observed frequencies. The Pearson chi-square goodness-of-ﬁt test is asymptotically ∼ χ2
(1) and the
p-value is 0.31, conﬁrming the absence of signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the data and the model pre-
diction.
6.3 External Validation
This section deals with out-of-sample validation (see e.g. Todd and Wolpin, 2006). The sample selected
in 2003 has not been used for the estimation of the structural model. If they remain unemployed,
the members of this sample will eventually receive the notiﬁcation letter at some point after June
2004. If we pay attention only to the period before the notiﬁcation however, as we do below, this
sample provides pre-program observations.21 We here address the following question: Is the model
estimated in Subsection 6.1 able to predict exits to employment and the wage distribution prior to the
introduction of the monitoring scheme? For this purpose, we have to consider the stationary version
of the estimated model, that is, the version where the policy is not implemented.
It turns out that economic conditions were notably worse in the pre-program period than during
the time the program was in place: GDP real growth attained only 0.8% in 2003 against 2.7% on
average between 2004 and 2006. This adversely aﬀected the exit rates to employment in the pre-
program period. Consequently, as no other data are available for another pre-program period, we
need to adjust the 2003 sample before conducting the external validation. This adjustment relies on
the assumption that the business cycle aﬀects the transition rate to employment of the treatment
group similarly as a slightly older group that was not aﬀected by the policy until July 2005 (by virtue
of being older). Appendix D provides more information about this adjustment.
The external validation consists then in checking whether at each month after the sampling date
the fractions of exits to employment, predicted under assumption of no monitoring by means of the
21These observations constitute a “non-random holdout sample” in the words of Keane and Wolpin (2007).
22Figure 3: External Validation
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(a) Cumulative probability of transition to full-time employment in 2004
in the absence of monitoring: model predictions (solid line) compared to
the unadjusted (crosses) and adjusted (circles; triangles for the 95% CI)
frequency in the control sample selected in 2003













(b) Survivor function of monthly net earnings in 2004 in the absence of
monitoring: model predictions (solid line) compared to the distribution in
the control sample selected in 2003 and its 95% CI (broken curves)
structural parameters reported in Subsection 6.1, closely ﬁt the same fractions of the pre-program
sample of the identical age adjusted for discrepancies in business cycle conditions. Figure 3(a) shows
the prediction of the exit fractions based on the structural model (solid line), the unadjusted fractions
(crosses), the adjusted fractions (circles) and the 95% CI around the latter (triangles).22
The validation exercise is also applied to accepted wages. Figure 3(b) displays the results. Here
we do not adjust for the diﬀerential business cycle conditions, since the downward rigidity of wages
is well documented in Belgium (see e.g. Fuss, 2009). Again, solid line is the prediction based on the
estimates of the structural model and broken curves are the nonparametric estimates of the distribution
22Ignoring the randomness of the adjustment factor denoted ˆ ∆
oj
k in Appendix D.
23of observed wages, along with the corresponding CI.
Figures 3(a-b) ﬁrmly establish an excellent out of sample ﬁt of the model in the environment with
no policy. This validates that we can use the parameter estimates of the structural model to construct
the counterfactual no-treatment outcomes for the treated sample and underscores the reliability of the
Average Treatment Eﬀects on the Treated (ATT) reported in Subsection 7.1.
6.4 Interpretation of Estimation Results Based on Simulations
Before reporting the average treatment eﬀects, we simulate the estimated model for the treated sample.
The aim is to gain insight into the behavioral adjustment of the unemployed as predicted by the model.
The model is simulated for each unemployed in the sample under the assumption that each evaluation
turns out to be negative. This choice is made here on purpose to keep the composition of the sample
unchanged all along the the diﬀerent stages of the monitoring scheme. Figure 4 displays the sample
average of these paths. It comprises four panels. The upper-right panel displays average eﬀective search
eﬀort levels. The measurement unit on the vertical axis is the monthly probability of a job-oﬀer. The
lower panels display the monthly net reservation wage (in euros) and the acceptance rate. Finally the
upper-left panel provides the monthly exit rate towards full-time employment. On the horizontal axis,
duration, measured in months, is normalized to zero at notiﬁcation. Solid lines represent the case
of an unemployed without an employment spell in the relevant period (e = 0) while the interrupted
lines correspond to someone with such an employment spell (e = 1). Before notiﬁcation, the average
monthly exit rate equals 0.061 (implying an expected unemployment duration of 16.4 months in a
stationary environment) and the acceptance rate is on average somewhat above 85%.23
Let us ﬁrst consider the case e = 1. If the unemployed is recruited after notiﬁcation (k = 0)
or after a negative evaluation (k ∈ {1,2}) and if she returns to unemployment, the probability of a
negative evaluation π1
k+1 is given by (20) and hence the expected utility before any interview (13) is not
aﬀected by accumulated search eﬀort ¯ S1(tk+1,tk). The interrupted line describes the average path for
an individual who ﬁnds a job after each stage of the scheme and returns to unemployment immediately
after. Between notiﬁcation and the ﬁrst interview (where π1
1 = 0.18), search eﬀort and the reservation
wage varies only slightly. The fact that a ﬁrst negative evaluation only results in signing an action plan
without any monetary sanction explains this. After the ﬁrst negative assessment of search eﬀort, the
decision variables adjust somewhat more than previously, since the individual approaches the second
evaluation at which she risks a temporary monetary sanction of the size indicated in Table 3. The
eﬀect of this sanction is especially apparent in the discontinuous jumps of the decision variables right
after the second negative evaluation. Between the second and the third interview, however, search
eﬀort declines and the reservation increases. To understand this, remember that the level of beneﬁts
is not further reduced if the unemployed is negatively evaluated at the third interview. Conversely, if
this evaluation is positive, the unemployed regains her entitlement to the high beneﬁt level. So, the
expected utility after the third evaluation is higher than the current expected utility between the second
negative evaluation and the third interview. Consequently, as time evolves, the prospect of beneﬁting
from this improvement gets closer and is increasingly valued because of discounting. The permanent
loss of UB entitlement when the third evaluation is negative abruptly enhances further search eﬀort
and pushes the reservation wage further down. As of that moment, the average acceptance rate equals
95%.24
Figure 4 also shows that the average paths are substantially diﬀerent if no job is found throughout








{1,2,3} is eﬀort dependent, as in (19). The level of search eﬀort (resp. reservation wage) is everywhere
23Note that these values also apply after a positive evaluation at any of the three interviews.
24Comparing the exit rate after the third negative evaluation to the one before notiﬁcation provides the ex-post
eﬀect induced by an unanticipated withdrawal of UB. This would increase the exit rate to full-time employment by 1.3
percentage points on average (namely, 0.074 − 0.061), which amounts to a relative increase of 21%.
24Figure 4: Predicted Optimal Paths at Average Characteristics of the Treated
























higher (resp. lower) than that under eﬀort-independent evaluation (e = 1). The higher search eﬀort
level reﬂects the additional return to search induced by: (i) the dependence of the sanction probability
on the average realized search eﬀort and (ii) the fact that if the job is lost and the worker returns
to unemployment, the probability of negative evaluation is lower. The lower reservation wage is
caused by the decline in expected lifetime utility that results from the higher sanction probability
for any given search eﬀort and the cost of this enhanced search eﬀort. The fact that search eﬀort
(resp., the reservation wage) monotonically increases (resp., decreases) with duration is in line with
the prediction of Proposition 1, suggesting that the qualitative results for the streamlined monitoring
scheme are robust to the introduction of more complex features. The most striking feature is the
front-loading of search eﬀort discussed in Section 2. This induces search eﬀort to increase above the
level attained after a permanent sanction, i.e. if a worker is negatively evaluated for a third time.
This observation demonstrates that front-loading is not merely a theoretical possibility.
7 Evaluation
7.1 Average Treatment Eﬀects on the Treated (ATT)
This section reports the treatment eﬀects conditional on participation to a given stage of the scheme
(i.e. respectively conditional on being notiﬁed and conditional on being negatively evaluated at a
25certain interview k ∈ {1,2,3}). Therefore, contrary to the previous subsection, a dynamic selection
process is at work. Two outcomes are considered: the fraction of exits to full-time employment and net
earnings. As by the length of the monitoring procedure only very few individuals in the original sample
run through all stages of this procedure (cf. Table 4), it is not very informative to compute ATT on
the original sample. We therefore increase the sample size by simulating the unemployment trajectory
since notiﬁcation for each and every individual in the original sample multiple times, where random
draws are made from the structural model. The measurement of ATT takes administrative delays
and the presence of the residual state into account. Once the discussion on the ATT is completed,
we construct a measure of the net impact of the monitoring scheme on the expected stream of labor
earnings, not conditioned on job ﬁnding, and conduct a basic cost-beneﬁt analysis based on a number
of synthetic inter-temporal indicators.
7.1.1 Exit to Full-Time Employment
The ATT at a particular duration since treatment at stage k of the scheme (k ∈ {0,1,2,3}) is computed
in the following steps. In a ﬁrst step one selects all individuals treated at stage k in a simulation of the
estimated model. In a second step one calculates for each individual the fraction of exits to full-time
employment at the considered duration both in the actual case of treatment at stage k and in the
counterfactual case of not being notiﬁed and monitored.25 In a last step one takes the diﬀerence of
these fractions and averages these diﬀerences over the treated population.
Figure 5: ATT on the Cumulative Exit Rate to Full-Time Employment at Each Stage of the Scheme
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Figure 5 plots the ATT against duration elapsed since the corresponding stage of the scheme.
25In this counterfactual case the unemployed is therefore in a stationary environment where the highest beneﬁt accrues
for an indeﬁnite duration.
26Note that administrative delays have been explicitly taken into account in these calculations. This
explains why the ATT are considered beyond the scheduled duration of each stage. Four months after
each treatment, the ATT of the notiﬁcation is small (+0.7 percentage points or + 6.5% in relative
terms),26 the ATT of the ﬁrst negative evaluation is bigger (+3.5 p.p. or +30%), the ATT of the
second negative evaluation is the largest one (+5.2 p.p. or +46%), and the ATT of the last negative
evaluation amounts to +3.6 p.p. (+31%). The ATT in the three ﬁrst panels of Figure 5 tend to
an upper-bound as the most aﬀected individuals have already found a job in case they did not yet
enter the next stage. The ranking of the stage-speciﬁc ATT can be understood on the basis our
explanation of the time paths displayed in Figure 4. Given the low chances of being hired, the spells
not interrupted by a job experience (e = 0) weigh more in the computed averages than the others
(e = 1). Then, the front-loading of search eﬀort explains that the highest impact is found between
the two last interviews.27
7.1.2 Net Earnings
As the monitoring scheme lowers reservation wages, one expects a causal negative impact on take-home
pay. The estimation of the ATT reveals, however, that this impact is weak.
The ATT are also computed in three steps. Compared to the computation of similar statistics in
Section 7.1.1, only the second step is modiﬁed. In this step, the actual and counterfactual reservation
wages are computed at all the considered durations and, subsequently, using this information the
expected net accepted wages are found. Note that these expected wages are always calculated for
all individuals treated in a particular stage k, irrespective of whether they are proposed a job at the
considered duration after treatment. Thereby, we avoid the sample selectivity bias (Heckman, 1979).
Figure 6 shows that the decline in average net earnings reaches a maximum after the second
negative evaluation, i.e. after the ﬁrst sanction: The mean loss amounts to about 30 e, which is
approximately 2% of net earnings in the absence of treatment.28 Observe that shortly before the
third interview (at least 4 months after the second interview) the expected net monthly earnings are
only slightly lower than after a negative evaluation at the third interview. This is the result of two
opposing factors. On the one hand the front-loading of job search intensity negatively aﬀects welfare,
and therefore the reservation wage, via the costs implied by such an intensiﬁed job search. On the
other hand, the worker who has not been evaluated yet has the perspective of regaining entitlement
to a high beneﬁt level in case of a positive evaluation at the third interview. The two opposing eﬀects
roughly balance out.
7.2 Basic Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
The previous subsections have shown that the monitoring scheme accelerates transitions to employ-
ment and causes a decline in expected net earnings if a transition to employment is made. Here
we attempt to measure the net eﬀect of these two outcomes. Subsequently, we engage in a modest
cost-beneﬁt analysis in which we evaluate the welfare gains of the new monitoring scheme for (i) the
unemployed; (ii) the public authorities; and (iii) the society as a whole. In this analysis we ignore
welfare impacts of the scheme on income risk, inequality and poverty, and make some simplifying
assumptions. The cost-beneﬁt analysis therefore only attempts to get a rough order of magnitude of
the welfare eﬀects.
26As mentioned in the introduction, Cockx and Dejemeppe (2010) estimate the ATT based on a RDD. If we replicate
their analysis on the same sample using the same outcome as here (exit to full-time salaried employment), then the
corresponding ATT are of the same order of magnitude: 1.4 and 3.4 percentage points, resp. four and eight months after
notiﬁcation. Both point estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
27ATT for speciﬁc groups are available upon request.
28ATT for speciﬁc groups are available upon request.
27Figure 6: ATT on the Mean Accepted Net Earnings at Each Stage of the Scheme
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All indicators reported in this section are calculated according to the same principle. They are
based on the expected discounted lifetime values computed in case of treatment and in the counterfac-
tual of no treatment, where expectations are taken at the moment of notiﬁcation. The impact of the
monitoring scheme is measured by taking for each notiﬁed individual the diﬀerence in the values of a
given indicator with and without treatment and averaging these diﬀerences over all individuals. By
multiplying these results with the discount rate we express them in euro per month and per notiﬁed
individual. We also report all the eﬀects in terms of percentage changes. Formal deﬁnitions of all our
welfare indicators can be found in Internet Appendix, Section C.
By comparing the stream of labor earnings with and without treatment we can evaluate how
the earnings gain generated by the scheme through boosting exits to employment compares with
the earnings loss induced by accepting jobs that pay lower wages. This initial comparison ignores
the stream of beneﬁts, net utility of leisure time and cost of search. It leads to the conclusion that
the monitoring scheme has increased the net expected stream of earnings by 10e per month, which
amounts to a relative rise of 1.9%. Hence, the positive eﬀect through the increased exit rate dominates,
the net relative impact of the scheme on expected earnings being small.
From the previous analysis, we know that the monitoring scheme induces a loss in expected welfare
for the unemployed. The question is how large this loss is. In order to compute this loss we do no
more only take the ﬂow value of net earnings into account, but also consider the ﬂow of unemployment
beneﬁts (including the reduced amount in case of a sanction), the value of leisure, and the cost of
search. We ﬁnd that the monitoring scheme imposes only a small expected cost on the unemployed
of 5e per month and per individual (a loss of 0.5% in relative terms).
To calculate the net impact of the the monitoring scheme on the expenditures of the public au-
thorities, we now include in the intertemporal indicator the ﬂow of beneﬁt payments and the costs
28of the interviews at the moment that they take place29 as expenditures, and the social contributions
and income taxes paid on labor earnings as revenues. Based on this calculation we conclude that the
monitoring scheme decreases the expenditures of the public authorities by 17e per month and per
notiﬁed unemployed. This amounts to a relative gain of 19%, which is quite important.
The beneﬁts for the public authorities do not correspond to the beneﬁts for society as a whole,
however. The reason is that part of the reduced expenditures of the public authorities consists in
transfers from the unemployed to tax payers and is therefore not a net gain to society (ignoring
distributional impacts). On the other hand, by inducing more individuals to work, more output is
produced which beneﬁts to society. To proxy net output, we subtract the individual costs of job
search and the costs of the monitoring scheme from the wage costs (a lower-bound for the value of
output) and the net value of leisure time. Besides, we assume that the employment generated by the
monitoring scheme does not induce substitution or displacement eﬀects. Using these assumptions, the
expected discounted value of net output amounts to 16e per month and per individual. There are,
however, additional beneﬁts to society. The aforementioned reduced public expenditures of 17e lower
the cost of public funding. Taking a value of 2 for the marginal cost of public funds (Kleven and
Kreiner, 2006), we then obtain on average a net eﬃciency gain for society of 50e (= 16 + 2 ∗ 17) per
month and per notiﬁed unemployed, or of 3.5% in relative terms.
8 Conclusion
Incentive schemes in which job search eﬀort is monitored typically inform unemployed workers well in
advance about the future instant at which, or from which (as in the scheme studied here), evaluations
take place. At the same time, job search requirements are often not sharply deﬁned or the measurement
of search eﬀort is imperfect, and evaluating caseworkers have some discretion in determining the
outcome of the evaluation. Consequently, the outcome of the evaluation process and, hence, whether
a sanction is imposed, is not deterministic: There does not exist a search eﬀort threshold that separates
sharply a positive evaluation from a negative one. In the past researchers have either assumed that
job search requirements are exactly determined in terms of job search eﬀort or, if not, that the timing
of the evaluations is completely random. A consequence of either assumption is that search behavior
of the unemployed worker is stationary. In the present paper we have relaxed these assumptions
by simultaneously taking into account that the timing of the evaluations is not completely random,
while the outcome of the evaluation may depend on past search eﬀort but never in a completely
deterministic way. In this institutional context, we have shown that the knowledge that at (or starting
from) a particular future instant a sanction is potentially pending induces an unemployed worker to
increase her job search intensity and reduce her reservation wage as she approaches this instant (see
Proposition 1). Job search behavior is thus genuinely non-stationary. In addition, if the unemployed
worker can inﬂuence the sanction probability by increasing search eﬀort, we have shown that she has
an incentive to front-load search eﬀort such that, prior to the moment the evaluation takes place,
search eﬀort may even be higher than when the sanction is actually imposed (see Proposition 2 and
the simulated behavior that results from our estimations reported in Figure 4). This front-loading of
job search eﬀort reveals a new trade-oﬀ in the choice between a time limit on the entitlement to UB
and a monitoring scheme as competing instruments to ﬁght moral hazard in UI: compared to a time
limit, monitoring may enhance job search eﬀort ex ante, but reduces it ex post. A detailed analysis of
this trade-oﬀ is an avenue for future research.
In the light of these ﬁndings, we have developed and estimated a non-stationary job search model
to evaluate the recently introduced scheme that monitors job search eﬀort of long-term unemployed
workers within the UI system in Belgium. The sample of treated individuals comprised young people
29Based on accounting information provided by the National Unemployment Oﬃce, we calculated that an interview
costs on average 100e.
29(aged between 25 and 30) living in a region where the average unemployment rate was rather low (less
than 5%). After validating our model both internally and externally, we found that the subsequent
stages of the monitoring scheme have boosted the job ﬁnding rate increasingly. Re-employment wages
were only aﬀected marginally and never more than 2% lower than what they would have been in the
absence of the reform. On the basis of a simple cost-beneﬁt analysis we conclude that as a consequence
of the reform (i) the unemployed workers loose slightly: on average 5e per month or 0.5% proportion-
ally; (ii) public expenditures fall by 17e per month and per individual, or 19% proportionally; (iii) the
society as a whole gains 50e per month and per individual, or 3.5% proportionally. These calculations
ignore, however, welfare impacts of the scheme on income risk, inequality and poverty. Moreover, the
results of this paper have assumed that the unemployed discount the future in a standard way and
have correct perceptions about the return to their search eﬀort. Introducing hyperbolic discounting
(Paserman, 2008) or biased beliefs (Spinnewyn, 2010) would be another interesting research avenue.
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Appendix
In this Appendix all time derivatives of functions evaluated at t0 and t1, implicitly denote the left-hand
side, respectively right-hand side derivatives of these functions at these points.
A The Streamlined Monitoring Scheme
A.1 Derivation of U(t0)
Consider time intervals of length dτ. The lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at time τ can be
written by the following recursive relation:
U(τ) =
￿
yh(τ)dτ + [1 − s(τ)dτ]U(τ + dτ) + s(τ)dτ
￿




where s(τ)dτ is the probability that a job oﬀer arrives between τ and τ + dτ. Rearrangement yields
ρdτU(τ) = yh(τ)dτ + s(τ)dτ ¯ F[wr(τ)]
￿ ¯ W(t + dτ) − U(t + dτ)
￿
+ [U(τ + dτ) − U(τ)]. (A-2)
Dividing by dτ, taking the limit for dτ → 0 and using that s(τ) ¯ F[wr(τ)] ≡ p(τ) leads to the following
diﬀerential equation:
˙ U(τ) − [p(τ) + ρ]U(τ) = −
￿
yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
(A-3)








yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0) (A-4)
Finally, integrating from t0 to t1 results in




yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0)dτ, (A-5)
which after rearrangement yields equation (6), with U(t1) = U(t1) given by (7).
A.2 The Generalized Current Value Hamiltonian
In this section we show how the optimization problem can be restated in terms of the generalized







yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0)dτ + U(t1)P(t1,t0)e−ρ(t1−t0)
s.t. : ˙ P(τ,t0) = −p(τ)P(τ,t0)
: ˙ ¯ S(τ,t0) =
[s(τ) − ¯ S(τ,t0)]
(τ − t0)
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H(τ) =
￿
yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0) − λP(τ)p(τ)P(τ,t0) + λS(τ)
s(τ) − ¯ S(τ,t0)
(τ − t0)
. (A-6)
where yh(τ) ≡ bh + ν − c[s(τ)] and λP(τ) and λS(τ) are the multiplier functions associated to the
state variables P(τ,t0) and ¯ S(τ,t0). Consider the FOC for P(τ,t0):
˙ λP(τ) = −∂H(τ)/∂P(τ,t0) = λP(τ)p(τ) −
￿
yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
e−ρ(τ−t0)





yh(τ) + p(τ) ¯ W(τ)
￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0).
Integrating this equation from τ to t1 gives




yh(x) + p(x) ¯ W(x)
￿
P(x,t0)e−ρ(x−t0)dx. (A-7)













yh(x) + p(x) ¯ W(x)
￿
P(x,τ)e−ρ(x−τ)dx+U(t1)P(t1,τ)e−ρ(t1−τ) ≡ U(τ). (A-8)




￿ ¯ W(τ) − U(τ)
￿￿
P(τ,t0)e−ρ(τ−t0) + λS(τ)
s(τ) − ¯ S(τ,t0)
(τ − t0)
.
Denoting the generalized current value of a variable x(τ) by ˜ x(τ) ≡ x(τ)eρ(τ−t0)/P(τ,t0), we can
deﬁne the generalized current value Hamiltonian as:
˜ H(τ) = yh(τ) + p(τ)
￿ ¯ W(τ) − U(τ)
￿
+ ˜ λS(τ)
s(τ) − ¯ S(τ,t0)
(τ − t0)
(A-9)
Using the deﬁnition of yh(τ), (4), the fact that ¯ W(τ) ≡ E[W(w)|w > wr(τ)] and (3) allows to simplify
this expression as follows:





{w − ρU(τ) + δ [U(0) − U(τ)]}dF (w)+˜ λS(τ)




One can easily see that the FOC for the control variables are not aﬀected if one uses ˜ H(τ) rather
than H(τ). The FOC of the state variables need, however, a slight modiﬁcation. To see this, consider






eρ(τ−t0)/P(τ,t0) = −˙ λX(τ)eρ(τ−t0)/P(τ,t0) = [p(τ) + ρ] ˜ λX(τ) − ˙ ˜ λX(τ) (A-11)
where the second equality follows from the FOC for X(τ) in H(τ) and the third equality from the
relationship between ˙ ˜ λX(τ) and ˙ λX(τ). The transversality condition is modiﬁed as follows:







where the second equality follows from the transversality condition for λX(t1) in H(t1).
A.3 The Derivation of the FOC for wr(τ) and s(τ)
We can now deﬁne the remaining FOC of our problem on the basis of the generalized current value
Hamiltonian deﬁned in (A-10) using the adjustments stated in (A-11) and (A-12). The FOC for wr(τ)
is obtained by setting ∂ ˜ H(τ)/∂wr(τ) = 0:
wr(τ) = ρU(τ) − δ [U(0) − U(τ)]. (A-13)
Now consider (A-3) and use the same arguments as in the step between (A-9) and (A-10). If one
inserts (A-13) into this expression one obtains:
ρU(τ) = bh + ν − c[s(τ)] +
s(τ)
R ∞
wr(τ)[w − wr(τ)]d ¯ F(w)
ρ + δ
+ ˙ U(τ) (A-14)
Diﬀerentiating (A-13) wrt to τ gives the law of motion of the reservation wage:
˙ wr(τ) = [ρ + δ] ˙ U(τ) (A-15)
Inserting (A-14) and (A-15) into (A-13) gives us the FOC for the reservation wage (10) in the main
text.
32Next the FOC for s(τ) is obtained by setting ∂ ˜ H(τ)/∂s(τ) = 0:
c′[s(τ)] =
R ∞












= [p(τ) + ρ]˜ λS(τ) − ˙ ˜ λS(τ) (A-17)
Dividing by ˜ λS(τ), rearranging, noting that ∂ ln ˜ λS(τ)/∂τ = ˙ ˜ λS(τ)/˜ λS(τ) and that (τ − t0)−1 =
∂ ln(τ − t0)/∂τ yields:
∂
∂τ
(ln ˜ λS(τ)) =
∂
∂τ
ln(τ − t0) + [p(τ) + ρ]













= π′[¯ S(t1,t0)][U− − U+] (A-19)




π′[¯ S(t1,t0)][U− − U+]P(t1,τ)e−ρ(t1−τ) ≥ 0. (A-20)
Inserting (A-13) and (A-20) into (A-16) yields the FOC for job search eﬀort (11) stated in the main
text.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof makes use of two lemmas: Lemmas 4 and 5. Lemma 4 is also required for the proof of
Proposition 3.
Lemma 4 ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1], ˙ U(τ) ≤ 0 ∧ U(τ) ≤ U+.
Proof.
1. Introduce the following notation:
V [U(τ)] ≡
R ∞







where the second equality follows from (A-13). The following property will be repeatedly used
in the proofs in this Appendix:
V ′[U(τ)] = − ¯ F[wr(τ)] < 0 (A-22)
332. Four impossibilities for any τ ∈ [t0,t1] will turn out to be helpful. The proofs are always by
contradiction and are repeatedly based on Equation (A-14) in which (A-21) is inserted.
(ia) U(τ) > U+ ∧ ˙ U(τ) ≤ 0 is impossible. If it was true, the following inequalities would hold:
ρU+ = bh + ν − c(s+) + s+V [U+]
≥ bh + ν − c(s(τ)) + s(τ)V [U+] since s+ is optimally chosen
> bh + ν − c(s(τ)) + s(τ)V [U(τ)] + ˙ U(τ) = ρU(τ) since V ′ < 0.
(ib) U(τ) ≥ U+ ∧ ˙ U(τ) < 0 is impossible. The proof of impossibility (ia) still holds because of
the sign of ˙ U(τ).
(ii) U(τ) ≤ U+ ∧ ˙ U(τ) > 0 is impossible. If it was true, the following inequalities would hold:
ρU(τ) = bh + ν − c(s(τ)) + s(τ)V [U(τ)] + ˙ U(τ)
> bh + ν − c(s+) + s+V [U(τ)]
≥ bh + ν − c(s+) + s+V [U+] = ρU+
(iii) U(τ) < U+ ∧ ˙ U(τ) ≥ 0 is impossible. If it was true, the following inequalities would hold:
ρU(τ) = bh + ν − c(s(τ)) + s(τ)V [U(τ)] + ˙ U(τ)
≥ bh + ν − c(s+) + s+V [U(τ)]
> bh + ν − c(s+) + s+V [U+] = ρU+ since V ′ < 0.
3. Next, we show that U(t1) ≤ U+. From Impossibility (ii), we can exclude that ˙ U(t1) > 0. For if
˙ U(t1) > 0, according to (ii), we should have U(t1) > U+ or, using (7),
π[¯ S(t1,t0)](U− − U+) > 0
which requires a (strictly) negative sanction probability.
Impossibility (iii) allows to exclude that ˙ U(t1) = 0 unless π[¯ S(t1,t0)] = 0. For if ˙ U(t1) = 0,
according to (iii), we should have U(t1) ≥ U+ or
π[¯ S(t1,t0)](U− − U+) ≥ 0
which requires π[¯ S(t1,t0)] = 0 i.e. U(t1) = U+.
In sum, one can only have
• either ˙ U(t1) = 0 and U(t1) = U+
• or ˙ U(t1) < 0 and U(t1) < U+ by the Impossibility (ib).
4. Suppose ∃˜ τ ∈ [t0,t1) : ˙ U(˜ τ) > 0, then by Impossibility (ii), U(˜ τ) > U+. This and the fact
that U(t1) ≤ U+ implies that ∃t∗ ∈ (˜ τ,t1) : ˙ U(t∗) < 0 ∧ U(t∗) > U+, which cannot be true by
Impossibility (ib). Therefore, ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1], ˙ U(τ) ≤ 0. Moreover, by Impossibility (ia), one has
U(τ) ≤ U+ , ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1].
Lemma 5 ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1], ˙ s(τ) ≥ 0






s(τ) ¯ F[wr(τ)] + ρ
￿ ˜ λS(τ)
τ − t0
− ¯ F[wr(τ)] ˙ U(τ)
)
(A-23)
34Lemma 4 and the non negative sign of ˜ λS(τ) (see (A-20)) imply that ˙ s(τ) ≥ 0.
Proof Proposition 1. Insert (A-21) in (A-14). Evaluate (A-14) for U(τ) = U+ and subtract it
from (A-21). Noting that ˙ U+ = 0, this yields:
˙ U(τ) = ρ
￿
U(τ) − U+￿
+ c[s(τ)] − c[s+] − s(τ)V [U(τ)] + s+V [U+]
Using (A-16) and (A-21) this can be rewritten as follows:





c(s+) − c[s(τ)] − c′[s(τ)][s+ − s(τ)]
￿
− s+ ￿






Expanding c[s(+)] in a second order Taylor expansion around c[s(τ)] then yields







[s+ − s(τ)]2 − s+ ￿





[s(τ) − s+] (A-24)
where s∗(τ) ∈ (s+,s(τ)).
1. Proof of Claim 1:
(a) ∃τ∗ < t1 such that ∀τ ∈ (τ∗,t1] : ˙ U(τ) < 0
If ˙ U(t1) < 0, claim (a) follows immediately. From Lemma 4, we know that ˙ U(t1) ≤ 0.
Therefore, if ˙ U(t1)  = 0, claim (a) must hold. Suppose instead that ˙ U(t1) = 0. We prove
by contradiction. By Lemma 4, we know that U(t1) = U+ and π
￿¯ S(t1,t0)
￿
= 0. This can
only be true if ¯ S(t1,t0) ≥ Ψ > s+. If s(t1) ≤ s+, by Lemma 5, s(τ) ≤ s(t1) ≤ s+, ∀τ ≤ t1,
but this contradicts that ¯ S(t1,t0) > s+. Consequently, s(t1) > s+. Two cases can now be
distinguished:
i. Either ˜ λS(t1) = 0. Equality (A-24) implies that ˙ U(t1) < 0, which contradicts that
˙ U(t1) = 0.
ii. Or ˜ λS(t1) > 0. Then ˙ s(t1) > 0 by (A-23). Using the deﬁnition in (A-21), diﬀerentiating
(A-14) wrt τ and using (A-22) gives
ρ ˙ U(τ) = ˙ s(τ)[V [U(τ)] − c′[s(τ)]] − s(τ) ¯ F[wr(τ)] ˙ U(τ) + ¨ U(τ)
where the double dot denotes the second derivative wrt τ. Inserting (A-16) leads to:




Therefore, as ˙ s(t1) > 0 and since by assumption ˙ U(t1) = 0, we must have that ¨ U(t1) >
0. Consequently, ∃ǫ > 0 such that ∀τ ∈ (t1 − ǫ,t1) : ˙ U(τ) < 0 and hence ∃τ∗ < t1 :
U(τ∗) > U(t1) = U+ which violates Part (ib) of Lemma 4.
(b) ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1] : ˙ U(τ) < 0.
We prove again by contradiction. Suppose that ˙ U(τ∗) = 0. Then, ¨ U(τ∗) ≥ 0 by (A-25) since
∀τ : ˙ s(τ) ≥ 0 by Lemma 5. Consequently, ∃ǫ > 0 such that ∀τ ∈ [τ∗,τ∗ + ǫ) : ˙ U(τ) ≥ 0,
but this contradicts claim (a).
(c) If ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1] : ˙ U(τ) < 0, it follows from (A-23) and from (A-15) that ∀τ ∈ [t0,t1) : ˙ s(τ) >
0 ∧ ˙ wr(τ) > 0.
352. Proof of Claim 2:
Since by (6) and (7) the lifetime utility is discontinuous at t1, unless π [S(t1,t0)] = 1, this must
also be the case for the control variables. This can be directly deduced by evaluating the FOC
(A-13) and (A-16) at the left-hand side and right-hand side of t1.
3. Proof of Claim 3:
By claim 1, ˙ U(t1) < 0. Therefore by impossibility (ib) in Lemma 4, U(t1) < U+. Using (7) it
must be that π[¯ S(t1,t0)](U+ − U−) > 0 and therefore π[¯ S(t1,t0)] > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By (11), using the notation deﬁned in (A-21), acknowledging that after a negative evaluation
the last term on the right-hand side of (11) is zero, and using that c′′(.) > 0, the following must hold:







Expanding V [U(t1)] in a Taylor series around V [U−], and using (A-22), (A-13) and that U(t1)−U− =
(1 − π[¯ S(t1,t0)])(U+ − U−) by (6) and (7) yields:
V [U(t1)] = V [U−] − ¯ F(w−
r )
￿
1 − π[¯ S(t1,t0)]
￿





U(t1) − U−￿2 (A-27)
where w∗
r ∈ [w−
r ,wr(t1)]. Inserting (A-27) in (A-26), noting that the second order term is always








r )(t1 − t0) (A-28)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. If s+ > 0, using (A-16) and (A-21), it must be that c′(0) < V (U+). Consequently, since
by Lemma 4 ∀τ : U+ ≥ U(τ), it follows by (A-22) that ∀τ : c′(0) < V [U(τ)]. This cannot hold if
π[¯ S(t1,t0)] = 1. If Ψ = 0, this can only occur if ¯ S(t1,t0) = 0. But then, since ∀τ : s(τ) ≥ 0, by (1)
∀τ ∈ [t0,t1] : s(τ) = 0 and therefore ∀τ : c′[s(τ)] = c′(0) < V [U(τ)]. But by (A-16), (A-20) and (A-21)
∀τ : c′[s(τ)] ≥ V [U(τ)]. A contradiction. Therefore π[¯ S(t1,t0)] < 1.
B Derivation of the Sample Average Probability of Negative Evaluation
In the main text it was explained that the sample average probability of negative evaluation at the
kth interview ¯ πk is estimated by a weighted sum of the expected individual probability of a negative
evaluation for each notiﬁed individual in the sample. Subscript i refers to a notiﬁed individual char-
acterized by a speciﬁc UB level, gender and schooling level. Eπki denotes the expected probability of
negative evaluation for a notiﬁed individual i conditional on being evaluated for kth time (k ∈ {1,2,3})
and irrespective of having experienced an employment spell since the last evaluation (e = 0 or e = 1).
PEki denote the probability that the kth evaluation takes place for individual i. Then, if N denotes
36the number of notiﬁed individuals, one can write the sample average probability as a weighted average













and where Eπ0i ≡ 1. In the model one cannot escape a ﬁrst evaluation (PE1i = 1), since the
duration counter that determines whether an evaluation will take place is temporarily halted rather
than reset to zero if an individual leaves unemployment for employment. Since employment spells
are exponentially distributed and since ¯ t∗
1, the maximum duration at which the evaluation takes
place, is ﬁnite, individuals will always eventually return to unemployment and be evaluated with
probability one.30 A second evaluation can only take place if one is negatively evaluated at the ﬁrst:
PE2i = Eπ1i. Finally, a third evaluation takes place only if the evaluation at the previous two was
negative: PE3i = Eπ1iEπ2i.
We now derive Eπki. The probability of negative evaluation depends on whether the unemployment
spell was interrupted by employment (e = 1) or not (e = 0), and if e = 0 on the timing τ of the interview
within the delay interval (τ ∈ [t′
k,¯ t∗
k]) and on the average search eﬀort ¯ S0

















where κ1 ≡ 1. The expected probability of negative evaluation Eπki is a weighted average of these






































































The expression contains four terms. The ﬁrst two terms weigh the probability of negative evaluation
for e = 1 (π1
k) by the probability of having found employment before the kth interview. This occurs
if employment is found during the scheduled interval [tk−1,t′
k) (ﬁrst term) or if employment is found
during the delay interval [t′
k,¯ t∗
k) before an interview takes place (second term). The third term weighs
for each τ ∈ [t′
k,¯ t∗






) by the probability
that an evaluation occurs before employment is found and integrates (“sums”) this over the delay
interval. The last term is the probability of negative evaluation for e = 0 if it takes place at the end






) weighted by the probability of neither having the kth interview
nor a transition to employment before ¯ t∗
k.
C Solving the Optimal Control Problem and Estimation
Estimation requires that the optimal control problem described in Section 3.2 has to be solved at
each iteration of the numerical optimization. Given a vector of all parameters of the model, for each
sampled individual the problem is solved, both for e = 0 and e = 1, by backward induction in the
following steps:
30This is an approximation, since in reality the duration counter determining the moment of evaluation is reset to zero
after an uninterrupted full time employment spell of 12 months.
37Step 0: The stationary problems are solved in case of a positive evaluation and in case of a sanction
after a third interview; U+ and U− are calculated.
Step 1.1: Given U+ and U−, the FOC for control variables are solved at ¯ t∗
3 to determine the endpoint
conditions for the paths of control variables at ¯ t∗
3. First we solve for endpoint conditions under
eﬀort-independent evaluation (e = 1), since for e = 1 FOC depend only on the knowledge of U+
and U−. Then we solve for endpoint conditions under eﬀort-dependent evaluation (e = 0), as
for e = 0 FOC require knowledge of U1
3,2(¯ t∗
3), available now from the former solution. Moreover,




, which itself contains an integral of the yet
unknown path of the search eﬀort. An initial guess for this probability is taken.
Step 1.2: Given the endpoint conditions of Step 1.1, the system of diﬀerential equations that describe
the evolution of the optimal paths of control variables is solved in the interval [t′
3,¯ t∗
3). This system
is obtained by the diﬀerentiation of the FOC for control variables with respect to time. First we
solve for optimal paths under eﬀort-independent evaluation (e = 1). Then we solve for optimal
paths under eﬀort-dependent evaluation (e = 0), since the solution of the system of diﬀerential
equations in this case requires knowledge of the path of U1
3,2(τ), τ ∈ [t′
3,¯ t∗
3), available now from
the former solution. Moreover, this system also requires knowledge of π0 ￿¯ S0(¯ t∗
3,τ)
￿
, τ ∈ [t′
3,¯ t∗
3),





3) at the scheduled date of the third interview t′
3 are computed.




3) from Step 1.2, the FOC for control variables are solved at
t′
3 to determine the endpoint conditions for the paths of control variables at t′
3. The endpoint
conditions are solved ﬁrst for the eﬀort-independent evaluation, followed by the eﬀort-dependent
evaluation (for the same reason as in Step 1.1).
Step 1.4: Given the endpoint conditions of Step 1.3 the system of diﬀerential equations that describe
the evolution of the optimal paths of control variables is solved in the interval [t∗
2,t′
3). First
we solve for optimal paths under eﬀort-independent evaluation, followed by eﬀort-dependent
evaluation (for the same reason as in Step 1.2). Likewise, the system of diﬀerential equations
under eﬀort-dependent evaluation requires knowledge of π0 ￿¯ S0(t′
3,τ)
￿
, τ ∈ [t∗
2,t′
3), for which the
initial guess is currently maintained.
Step 1.5: The solution of Steps 1.1-1.4 provides us with the optimal path of search eﬀort s0 (τ) on
[t∗
2,¯ t∗
3). This is used to update the initial guess about π0 ￿¯ S0(¯ t∗
3,τ)
￿
, τ ∈ [t∗
2,¯ t∗
3), and Steps 1.1-1.4
are repeated again until convergence in s0 (τ). Upon convergence the value of the lifetime utility
U0
3,1(t∗
2) at the actual date of the second interview is evaluated.
Step 2: We go back to Step 1.1, replace U− by U0
3,1(t∗
2), as calculated in Step 1.5, and iterate until
convergence. The result is the lifetime utility U0
2,1(t∗
1) at the actual date of the ﬁrst interview.
Step 3: We continue in this way until arriving at t∗
0, the moment of notiﬁcation.31
The above described solution algorithm takes the vector of all parameters of the model as given.
Parameters of the model are described by two likelihood functions: (22) determines all parameters
but {βe
1}e=0,1, and (23) determines {βe
1}e=0,1. Consequently the estimation is performed in two stages:
Stage 1: For the initial values of {βe
1}e=0,1 and the rest of the parameters, (22) is maximized
conditional on {βe
1}e=0,1. The resulting estimates are used to compute, based on Steps 0 to 3,
the average search eﬀort at the ﬁrst interview ¯ S0(t∗
1,t∗
0) for all individuals who are observed to
have the ﬁrst interview.
31Detailed expressions of the systems of endpoint conditions and optimal paths at each step are provided in the Internet
Appendix, Section B.
38Stage 2: Given ¯ S0(t∗
1,t∗




3}e=0,1 are updated as described at the end of Section 4.2 and in Appendix B. Based on these
new parameter estimates Steps 0 to 3 are implemented as input for Stage 1.
Stages 1 and 2 are iteratively repeated until convergence in all parameters of the model.
D Adjustment of pre-program data
In addition to the sample of treated and the pre-program sample, we exploit two other samples: A
sample selected in 2003 and another one in 2004, both according to exactly the same selection criteria
as in Section 5.1 except that the workers are now aged between 30 and 32 instead of between 25 and
30 years. Let
• k = 1,2...,12 denote the number of months of unemployment since the sampling date;
• t = 0 if the sampling date is in 2003 and t = 1 if the sampling date is in 2004;
• j = e if exit is to employment and j = r if exit is to the residual state;
• l = y if one is aged between 25 and 30 and l = o if one is aged between 30 and 32.
For these four samples (for j ∈ {y,o} and t ∈ {0,1}) the aggregate transition rate in the absence of
monitoring to destination j ∈ {e,r} after k months of unemployment is assumed to be proportional















be identiﬁed from the 2003 and 2004 samples of the older group. The estimated parameters ˆ ∆
j
k are
then used to adjust the cumulative fraction of exits to employment among young workers sampled in
2003 in such a way that these exits reﬂect the business cycle conditions faced by the sample drawn in
2004: ˆ h
yj
k1 = exp{ˆ α
yj
k + ˆ ∆
j
k}.
E Internet Appendix, Code and Instructions for Replication
Internet Appendix is available at:
http://www.empirical.economics.uni-mainz.de/Dateien/CDLViapp.pdf
Data and code ready for replication can be downloaded at:
http://www.empirical.economics.uni-mainz.de/Dateien/CDLV.zip
Instructions for using the code and replicating our key results are accessible at:
http://www.empirical.economics.uni-mainz.de/Dateien/CDLVusecode.pdf
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